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ABSTRACT
Security of innovative technologies in future generation networks such as (Cyber
Physical Systems (CPS) and Wi-Fi has become a critical universal issue for individu-
als, economy, enterprises, organizations and governments. The rate of cyber-attacks
has increased dramatically, and the tactics used by the attackers are continuing to
evolve and have become ingenious during the attacks. Intrusion Detection is one of
the solutions against these attacks. One approach in designing an intrusion detec-
tion system (IDS) is software-based machine learning. Such approach can predict
and detect threats before they result in major security incidents. Moreover, despite
the considerable research in machine learning based designs, there is still a relatively
small body of literature that is concerned with imbalanced class distributions from the
intrusion detection system perspective. In addition, it is necessary to have an effec-
tive performance metric that can compare multiple multi-class as well as binary-class
systems with respect to class distribution. Furthermore, the expectant detection tech-
niques must have the ability to identify real attacks from random defects, ingrained
defects in the design, misconfigurations of the system devices, system faults, human
errors, and software implementation errors. Moreover, a lightweight IDS that is small,
real-time, flexible and reconfigurable enough to be used as permanent elements of the
system’s security infrastructure is essential.
The main goal of the current study is to design an effective and accurate in-
iv
trusion detection framework with minimum features that are more discriminative
and representative. Three publicly available datasets representing variant networking
environments are adopted which also reflect realistic imbalanced class distributions
as well as updated attack patterns. The presented intrusion detection framework is
composed of three main modules: feature selection and dimensionality reduction, han-
dling imbalanced class distributions, and classification. The feature selection mecha-
nism utilizes searching algorithms and correlation based subset evaluation techniques,
whereas the feature dimensionality reduction part utilizes principal component anal-
ysis and auto-encoder as an instance of deep learning. Various classifiers, including
eight single-learning classifiers, four ensemble classifiers, one stacked classifier, and
five imbalanced class handling approaches are evaluated to identify the most efficient
and accurate one(s) for the proposed intrusion detection framework.
A hardware-based approach to detect malicious behaviors of sensors and actu-
ators embedded in medical devices, in which the safety of the patient is critical and
of utmost importance, is additionally proposed. The idea is based on a methodology
that transforms a device’s behavior rules into a state machine to build a Behavior
Specification Rules Monitoring (BSRM) tool for four medical devices. Simulation
and synthesis results demonstrate that the BSRM tool can effectively identify the
expected normal behavior of the device and detect any deviation from its normal
behavior. The performance of the BSRM approach has also been compared with a
machine learning based approach for the same problem. The FPGA module of the
BSRM can be embedded in medical devices as an IDS and can be further integrated
with the machine learning based approach. The reconfigurable nature of the FPGA
chip adds an extra advantage to the designed model in which the behavior rules can
be easily updated and tailored according to the requirements of the device, patient,
treatment algorithm, and/or pervasive healthcare application.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a software-based application or a hard-
ware device that is used to identify malicious behavior (which is commonly known as
attacks) in the network. Through years, the types of attacks have increased dramat-
ically in the network, and the tactics used by the attackers are continuing to evolve
and become ingenious during the attacks. Thus, IDS is a necessary addition to the
security infrastructure, and the IDS must accommodate new diversified types of at-
tacks, security threats, and new vulnerabilities as well as handle older attacks that
have not disappeared or have not evolved. IDS allows the organizations and/or net-
works to protect their systems and/or devices. For decades, IDS developers employed
various approaches to build an IDS. One of these approaches is Machine Learning
(ML) [1], and more specifically; classification to detect cyber-attacks. This approach
requires a dataset that encompasses training and testing data. In this contest, this
dissertation reviewed the existing datasets and its usage in IDS and ML between
2014 and 2018. The review includes six datasets, namely: AWID [2], UNSW-NB15
[3, 4, 5], GPRS [6], CIDDS-001 [7] , CICIDS2017 [8] and UGR’16 [9], as well as 55
research articles. Descriptive statistics about the reviewed studies are stated which
include: the applied algorithms, the size and type of the used dataset for training and
testing, classification output classes as binary or multi-class, and whether the dataset
has balanced or imbalanced class distributions as tabulated in Table 1.1.
A great deal of previous research regarding IDS has focused on binary classifi-
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Table 1.1: Descriptive information related to reviewed dataset
Dataset Labeling Type Missing Value Dataset Split Format Skew ratio Environment Features
AWID Labeled Multi-class Yes Train and Test Files Packet 3:1 Wi-Fi 154
CICIDS2017 Labeled Multi-class No Single File Packet, Bi- directional Flow 5:1 TICS 83
CIDDS-001 Labeled Binary-class No Train and Test Files Uni- directional Flow 10:1 TICS 14
cation. Moreover, previous studies of intrusion detection systems have not dealt with
classification of network traffic data with imbalanced class distribution. The issues
pertaining to imbalanced classes and frequent occurrence of such cases call for further
research efforts. This dissertation considers multi-class datasets and imbalanced class
distributions. Imbalanced data can be numerically defined by the skew ratio between
the classes [10].
Machine learning, and more specifically, classification of network traffic, is an
effective approach to automate and simplify the development of intrusion detection.
Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in security threats and attacks. Fur-
thermore, the imbalanced class distribution problem is prevalent in network traffic
records. These records have different types of attacks; some of these are present; some
overwhelming; whereas, other attacks are somehow rare in the collection of network
connection traffic records. For instance, the AWID-ATK-R dataset [2] contains fifteen
types of attacks: Among these fifteen types of attacks, the power-saving, CTS, RTS,
and Chop-chop are intrinsically rare in their class distribution compared to other
types of attacks.
In the literature, Intrusions detection performance can be evaluated through
a set of metrics. There are many well known performance measures such as False
Positive Rate (FPR), True Positive Rate (TPR,) F-Measure [11], Matthews Corre-
lation Coefficient (MCC) [12], Cohen Kappa [13, 14, 15, 16], Area Under Receiver
Operating Characteristic Curve (ROC) [13, 16], Area Under Precision Recall Curve
(PRC ), and Accuracy.
Usually, the overall accuracy is used to measure the effectiveness of a classifier.
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Unfortunately, because of the presence of imbalanced data, the overall accuracy may
fail to provide adequate information about the performance of the classifier. Further-
more, the accuracy is very sensitive to the class distribution and might be misleading
in some way. This becomes even more complicated within multi-class problems. In
this dissertation, we evaluate the performance in multi-class and binary-class schemes.
Since the accuracy is not an adequate measure of the effectiveness of the classifier
model, we calculate the geometric mean [17, 18, 19] (G-mean) as the higher root of
the product of sensitivity for each class. Furthermore, this dissertation extends the
combined metric [20] such that it can work for multi-class problems.
1.1 Research Problem and Scope
This dissertation aims to address research challenges of designing efficient in-
trusion detection systems, mainly based on machine learning approaches. Our goal is
to also design and validate intrusion detection utilization in current and imbalanced
class distribution datasets [21]. Furthermore, as an IDS case study, it examines be-
havior specification rule-based detection [22], and investigates the impact of using a
hardware approach to detect malicious behavior in sensors and actuators that are
embedded in medical devices.
1.2 Motivation and Objective
Network Security has become a critical universal issue for individuals, economy,
enterprises, organizations and governments. The rate of cyber-attacks has increased
dramatically, and the tactics used by the attackers are continuing to evolve and
have become ingenious during attacks. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are one
of the solutions against these attacks. Furthermore, innovative technologies of future
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generation networks such as Cyber Physical System (CPS), and Wireless network
commonly known as Wi-Fi have emerged, which require a distinguished understand-
ing of the main challenges and constraints that face the design and implementation
of an IDS for such systems. Thus, IDS always need to improve its performance in
terms of increasing the accuracy and decreasing false alarms. In machine learning
based IDS, integrating efficient feature selection and feature dimensionality reduction
with intrusion detection has shown to be a successful approach since it can help in
selecting the most informative features and/or reduce the feature dimensionality from
the complete set of features. More specifically, classification of network traffic data
with imbalanced class distribution has posed a significant drawback of the perfor-
mance attainable by most well-known classifier learning algorithms, which assume a
relatively balanced class distribution and equal misclassification costs. Imbalanced
class distribution and frequent occurrences of such cases call for more research and
investigation. The objective of this study is to utilize various techniques to build an
IDS with the aim to advance the classification of imbalanced data.
1.3 Contributions
Despite of the amount of research that has been done on intrusion detection
systems to improve the concerns associated with the Accuracy, Recall, Precision, and
False Negative Rates, it is still a challenging task which requires more investigation.
Moreover, relatively little research has been carried out on multi-class classification,
and even less on imbalanced datasets. The goal of this dissertation is to propose
workable solutions to this problem by offering new methodologies for multi-class and
binary-class classification. The key contributions of this dissertation include:
(1) It provides a review of the existing datasets for ML-based IDS between 2014
and 2018. The aim of providing this review is to identify the available datasets
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that can be utilized to build an IDS for different networking systems. In
addition, guidelines are presented for selecting the appropriate dataset that
can serve as a general reference for IDS researchers.
(2) It develops a new performance metric (CombinedMc ) to evaluate the per-
formance of intrusion detection systems. The proposed metric will enable
researchers to compare multi-class systems by incorporating individual class
distributions and three metrics which are accuracy, detection rate and false
alarm rate.
(3) It extracts four different number of selected Features Sets (FS): 32-FS, 10-
FS, 7-FS, and 5-FS. The key contributions among these feature sets include
extracting a new subset of 5 features that produce high accuracy with minimum
false positives (FP) and validated using the 10-fold cross validation approach.
(4) In addition, a thorough investigation of the extracted features set performance
using the most common machine-learning based classifiers used in the litera-
ture, namely AdaBoost [23, 24], Random Forest [25], Random Tree [16], J48
[26, 27], Logit Boost [28, 29, 30], Multi-Layer Perceptron [31, 32], ZeroR, OneR,
and Simple logistic is carefully studied and experimentally evaluated.
(5) It reduces the CICIDS2017 dataset’s feature dimensions from 81 to 10, while
maintaining a high accuracy of 99.6% in multi-class and binary classification.
(6) It highlights the importance of imbalanced class problems in network traffic for
devising an effective IDS, and studies the effect of various sampling techniques
on the CIDDS-001 dataset along with different classification approaches. More-
over, it explores the influence of class distribution on other IDS datasets as
well, and utilizes sampling techniques for balancing the datasets in multi-class
and binary classes.
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(7) A uniform distribution based balancing (UDBB) approach is developed to
handle the imbalanced distribution of the minority class instances in the CI-
CIDS2017 network intrusion dataset.
(8) As a real-life IDS application and a case study, this work also proposes and
analyzes a hardware-based specification rule approach using an FPGA module
for malicious behavior of sensors and actuators embedded in medical devices
to protect the safety of patients. The performance of machine learning based
approaches have also been tested for the same application. The FPGA module
can be embedded within medical devices so that the device that is being mon-
itored for its behavior, can easily be seen for any deviation from its behavior
specification. This is critical and of utmost importance for patients’ safety.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
the background, taxonomy and literature survey related to machine learning based
intrusion detection as well as the relevant existing datasets and an introduction to
relevant cyber physical systems. Chapter 3 is concerned with the methodology used
for this study. Chapter 4 explores the implementation and test plan. Next, the results
and findings of the research are presented and discussed in Chapter 5. Afterwards,
statistical analysis is performed and discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 pro-
vides the conclusions, brief summary, and critiques of the research findings. Areas
for further research are also identified in the same chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND, TAXONOMY
AND LITERATURE SURVEY
This chapter begins by providing a background overview and taxonomy of In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDS). Then, it examines imbalanced class problems in
IDS’s. Next, it goes on to a review of existing datasets in machine learning based
IDS’s between 2014 and 2018. Afterwards, it attempts to provide a brief summary
of the structure, attacks, as well as the state-of-the-art work related to the AWID
dataset [2]. Then, the overall structure, attacks, and relevant work of the CICIDS2017
dataset is provided. Following CICIDS2017, a brief overview of the recent CIDDS-001
related work is also provided. Then, previous work investigating imbalanced classes
in IDS’s have been studied. Finally, a summary relevant to a sample of IDS for Cyber
Physical Systems is provided.
2.1 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can be defined as the process of detecting
and identifying the non-permitted access to the services, activities, system informa-
tion and resources of network systems [33]. This concept was first described in the
early eighties [34]. In general, and from a system architecture perspective, the core
functions of an intrusion detection system consists of three essential elements [35], as
shown in Figure 2.1; Collecting data concerning adversary, Analyzing the data, and
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Figure 2.1: IDS core functions
Responding to the analysis. Examples of adversary data collection may include sys-
tem logging information from a local host or multi-hosts, user activity on operating
systems and the recording traffic received and sent on network interfaces, or it can
be of both types. Analysis may include statistical methods such as Markova Process
Marker, Multivariate, Unvigilant, Time series and Operational Statistical Moment
[35]. Another example of analysis is machine learning which includes techniques such
as bayesian network, genetic algorithm, neural network, fuzzy logic and outlier de-
tection. Other examples of analysis are string and pattern matching, probabilistic
analysis, and data mining which include frequent pattern mining, classification, clus-
tering, and mining data streams. Examples of responses may include spreading an
alarm, updating routing tables, and closing a session. The first two core functions
have been treated numerously in the literature. In contrast, the third function was
less treated [35, 36].
8
2.2 IDS Classification Tree Hierarchy
Moving up in this section, a hierarchical classification tree is developed to orga-
nize the sample of the existing IDS’s, and are chosen carefully to reflect the extensive
groups of research work under investigation. Also, these classification criteria are
important as it represents a solid scientific base that group and bind certain IDS’s
together. Figure 2.2 shows the hierarchical classification tree of IDS based on three
classification criteria [37]:
(1) Time-line: A measure that identifies "When" the analyzing process takes place
to detect the intrusions.
(2) Audit Material: A criterion that determines "How" the information collection
process is accomplished for data analysis.
(3) Detection approach: A standard that identifies "How" the malicious activities
will be interfered by the IDS for identifying the intrusions.
Figure 2.2: IDS classification tree
2.2.1 Time Line
According to the Time-line criterion, IDS can be grouped into real-time IDS
and oﬄine IDS. In a real-time approach, the analyzing process takes place while the
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sessions are ongoing, and the IDS immediately sets on its alarm to indicate that
an attack is detected. In an oﬄine IDS, the analyzing process takes place after the
information has been already collected.
2.2.2 Audit Material
The analyzed data (audit material) can be collected by different schemes [37].
These include: host-based, network-based, and hybrid-based approaches.
2.2.3 Detection Approach
In general, IDS’s can be grouped based on the detection approach into: signature-
based detection, anomaly-based detection, and specification behavior-based detection.
Signature-based detection maintains a database of various known attack signatures.
Thus, it reveals the use of patterns from prior known threats. On the other hand,
anomaly-based detection methods examine and recognize intrusion behavior based
on verifying the prior activities and checks for any deviations from the normal traffic
behavior [38]. Detection approaches are specification behavior-based, hybrid-based,
signature-based, anomaly-based, and cross-layer based approaches. These approaches
have their own pros and cons which make them suitable for a specific type of net-
working environment. Next, detailed discussion about each classification approach is
given.
2.2.3.1 Anomaly-Based Detection (ABD)
This technique was proposed in 1987 [39]. The fundamental concept behind
this technique is to define the behavior of the network and/or system, and then this
predefined behavior is compared with the normal behavior. The result will be either
to accept it or it will trigger the alarm management system for further investigation.
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The function of the anomaly-based IDS is performed by two phases, which are (1)
training phase and (2) detection phase. A normal profile of the network traffic (net-
work behavior) and/or system information logs are generated throughout the training
phase. In the detection phase, the actual traffic is matched to the current normal
profile that searches for any deviations. The network administrator and the network
security experts prepare the accepted network behavior profiles. The constructed
profiles are based on users’ logging information, servers’ logging information, and
network connection features such as protocol type, flags and so on. The applicability
of this approach is defined by the attribute’s nature as well as the features of the
targeted system under investigation. Based on processing methods [40], the Anomaly
Based Detection (ABD) can be categorized into (1) data mining-based [41, 42], (2)
statistical-based, (3) traffic analysis-based systems, (4) probabilistic-based, and (5)
machine learning based. The dissertation does not engage with statistical-based, traf-
fic analysis-based systems, and probabilistic-based. methods. This dissertation will
focus on machine learning based approaches and hardware rules based co-designs.
2.2.3.2 Signature-Based Detection (SBD)
This technique, which is a pattern-based detection [36] approach, implements
an intruder profiling mechanism that looks for run time features that correspond to
a pre-determined unique feature of misbehavior actions or attacks. These techniques
are recognized not only by their low false positive rates, but also by their ability to
detect non-zero day attacks with high accuracy. On the contrary, it cannot pinpoint
zero-day attacks or adjusted attacks. The main research challenge in signature-based
detection is not only to create a powerful attack dictionary, but also to add new
attack patterns. Compared to the anomaly-based detection technique, this technique
requires more computation and resources [43].
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2.2.3.3 Hybrid-Based Detection (HBD)
In 2007, a study by Kai et al. [44] proposed the design principles and evaluation
results of the Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). The basic concept in this
method is to use a combination of two or more previously mentioned methods. Many
researchers use this technique to implement an IDS model which helps in enhancing
the system’s detection ability to disclose novel as well as known security attacks [45].
2.2.3.4 Specification Behavior Detection (SBD)
In 2003, specification based detection methodology was introduced by [46, 47],
which provided the capability to detect non-zero day attacks as well as zero-day
attacks, while exhibiting a low false positive rate. In this method, the detection
process is accomplished through developing the behavioral specification of legitimate
system behaviors manually. This approach is used as a basis for both detecting
attacks and characterizing the legitimate system behavior. The intruder activity can
be identified by observing the normal system and/or users’ behavior of the targeted
system under investigation. It can recognize endeavors to exploit new and unexpected
vulnerabilities as well as recognizes misuse of privileges kinds of attacks which do not
really take advantage of any security vulnerability [47]. One of the advantages of
this method is that it can avoid false positives since the specification can capture
all legitimate behavior. However, developing an error-free, complete and detailed
specification for the system is a challenging task. The approaches that are used with
this method can be statistics, neural networks, expert systems, computer immunology,
state machines or extended finite state automata, and user intention.
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2.3 Imbalanced Class Problems in IDS
The problem of learning from skewed multi-class datasets is an important topic
that arises very often in practice in classification problems. In such problems, almost
all the instances are labeled as one class (called the majority, or negative class), while
far fewer instances are labeled as the other class or classes (often called the minority
class(es), or positive class(es)); usually the more important class(es).
2.4 Review of Existing Datasets Usage in IDS and ML
New cases of intrusions, new bugs, security issues and vulnerabilities are evolv-
ing every day. Consequently, developers in the domains of intrusion detection are
constantly designing new methods to minimize the effect of these security issues.
However, accessing suitable datasets for evaluating various research designs in these
domains is a major challenge for the research community, vendors and data donors
over the years [8]. According to Nehinbe [48], these challenges are data privacy
issues, getting approval from the data owners, scope of evaluative datasets, differ-
ent research objectives, problem of documentation, understanding the datasets, data
labeling, availability of evaluative datasets, and finally discrepancies in evaluative
datasets. Moreover, in order to design an efficient machine learning based IDS, it is
important to build the classification models through representative datasets [49].
To sum up, there are numerous datasets available in the literature. Some of
these datasets are not available for public access such as IRSC [51] and SANTA[52].
Others such as KDDCUP99 [53, 54, 55], which was released in 1999, and NSL-KDD
[56] that was released in 2009 have grown increasingly irrelevant as new attack types
and methods have emerged that are not reflected by these older datasets.
Considering all the points mentioned, this dissertation presents the sample of
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Table 2.1: Sample of existing IDS dataset citations from 2014 to 2018
Year Dataset Environment Citations Count
2015 UNSW-NB15 [5, 50] TICS 36
(Traditional Information
Communication Systems)
2015 AWID [2] Wi-Fi 18
2014 GPRS [6] Wi-Fi 4
2016 CIDDS-001 [7] TICS 4
2016 UGR’16 [9] TICS 1
2017 CICIDS2017 [8] TICS 10
the existing datasets in Table 2.1. Moreover, it reviews the usage of these datasets in
ML-based IDS and the findings are summarized in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
2.5 AWID-ATK-R Structure
AWID-ATK-R, a subset of AWID, is a labeled dataset with a total number
of 155 features. AWID-ATK-R was collected based on real traces of normal and
intrusion activities of the 802.11 Wi-Fi network [2] and it has a finer grained class
labeling corresponding to the attack name. The training set consists of 10 classes
namely Amok, Arp, Authentication request, Beacon, Caffe latte, Deauthentication,
Evil twin, Frag- mentation, Probe response and Normal. The total number of records
in the training set is 1,765,000. The normal traffic encompasses 1,633,190 records
while the attacks records are 162,358. On the other hand, the total number of records
in the test set is 575,643 records. The normal traffic comprises of 530,785 records.
At the same time, the attacks records are 44,585. In addition, the test set has 15
classes with 7 different classes compared to the training set, namely Chop- chop, CTS,
Disassociation, Hirte, Power-saving, Probe request and RTS. Furthermore, Probe
response and Authentication- request are included in the training set only. Table 3
highlights the characteristics of the AWID-ATK-R subset.
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Table 2.2: Review of existing datasets’ usage in machine learning based IDS between
2014 and 2018
Approaches Dataset Year
SVM (Classification)+ GA (Feature selection) [57] UNSW-NB15 2016
ANN+GA [58] UNSW-NB15 2016
Multi-class Cascade ANN [59] UNSW-NB15 2017
ANN [60] UNSW-NB15 2017
Multiscale Hebbian neural network [61] UNSW-NB15 2017
Geometric Area Analysis and Big Data [62] UNSW-NB15 2017
Feature Selection + Central points [63] UNSW-NB15 2017
K-Support Vector Classification-Regression [64] UNSW-NB15 2017
Decision engine [65] UNSW-NB15 2017
Features Selection [66] UNSW-NB15 2017
Beta Mixture Models and Outlier Detection [67] UNSW-NB15 2016
Repeated Sampling and Clustering +Cross Validation [68] UNSW-NB15 2016
Bagged trees, RUSBoost, LogitBoost, GentleBoost [69] UNSW-NB15 2017
Cognitive Approach, Classification [70] UNSW-NB15+AWID 2017
ANN [71] UNSW-NB15 2017
Binary Tree+SVM [72] UNSW-NB15 2016
ANN+Naïve Bayes, C.45 Association Rule[73] UNSW-NB15 2017
Multiverse optimization+ANN [74] UNSW-NB15 2017
SVM+KNN+Decision Trees+Rapper [75] UNSW-NB15 2017
Deep Learning [76] UNSW-NB15 2017
LogicitBoost [29] UNSW-NB15 2017
REpTree [30] UNSW-NB15 2017
Honeypots+Fuzzy hashing [31] UNSW-NB15 2017
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [77] UNSW-NB15 2017
Ontology-based+Intuitionistic Fuzzy Logic (IFL) [78] UNSW-NB15 2016
MLP [79] UNSW-NB15 2017
GA+trees driven rule induction [80] UNSW-NB15 2018
Software Defined Networking [81] UNSW-NB15 2017
GA+logistic regression+decision tree [82] UNSW-NB15 2017
logistic Regression+SVM-RBF+ SVM-Polynomial [83] UNSW-NB15 2016
Security architecture [84] UNSW-NB15 2016
k-means algorithm [85] UNSW-NB15 2017
Linear regression (LR) + random forest (RF) [86] UNSW-NB15 2017
(k-NN)+Gradient Descent ANN+Hebbian algorithm [87] UNSW-NB15 2017
J48, AdaBoost, OneR [2] AWID-CLS-R 2015
Deep Abstraction+SAE+Weighted feature selection [88] AWID-CLS-R 2018
2.5.1 Attacks in AWID
In this dissertation, AWID was selected as one of the benchmark datasets for
its reliability, validity, and it’s highly imbalanced class distribution. To the best
of our knowledge, this dataset is considered as a unique dataset tied to the Wi-Fi
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Table 2.3: Review of existing datasets’ usage in machine learning based IDS between
2014 and 2018 (cnt’d)
Approaches Dataset Year
Random Forest+RandomTree+J48 [89] AWID-CLS-R 2017
Bagging+MLP+Naïve Bayes [90] AWID-ATK-R 2018
AdaBoost+logitBoost+ZeroR [91] AWID-ATK-R 2018
Variational AE+Staged Classifiers+Majority voting [92, 93] CICDS-001 2018
Deep learning [94] AWID-CLS-R 2016
Random Tree +RandomForest [95] AWID-ATK-R 2017
PSO+Association rules [96] AWID-CLS-F 2017
Fully Unsupervised Deep Learning [50] AWID-CLS-R 2017
Semi-supervised Deep Learning [97] AWID-CLS-R 2016
Features selection+SVM+CFS+Corr+ANN [5, 98] AWID-CLS-R 2017
PSO+SVM [99] AWID-CLS-R 2017
Multi agent ANN [70] AWID-CLS-R 2017
LibSVM+J48+Random Forest+Logistic [100] GPRS 2016
Gradient boosted machine [77] GPRS+UNSW-NB15 2017
Multi Level Classifier [101] GPRS 2017
KNN+RF+ID3+Adaboost+ MLP+Naïve-Bayes+QDA [102] GPRS 2018
KNN [103] CIDDS-001 2018
PCA [104] UGR’16 2017
Table 2.4: AWID-ATK-R dataset
AWID-ATK-R
AWID-ATK-R-Trn AWID-ATK-R-Tst
Count Type Percentage Count Type Percentage
1633190 normal 92% 477 amok < 1%
31180 amok 2% 13644 arp 3%
64609 arp 4% 599 beacon < 1%
3500 authentication_request < 1% 379 cafe_latte < 1%
1799 beacon < 1% 2871 chop_chop 1%
45889 cafe_latte 2% 1759 cts < 1%
10447 deauthentication < 1% 4445 deauthentication 1%
2633 evil_twin < 1% 84 disassociation < 1%
770 fragmentation < 1% 611 evil_twin < 1%
1558 probe_response < 1% 167 fragmentation < 1%
19089 hirte 3%
530785 normal 92%
165 power_saving < 1%
369 probe_request < 1%
199 rts < 1%
environment. Wi-Fi is expected to increase sharply in the coming years as it is being
used for not only wireless local area connectivity, but also for Internet of Thing (IoT)
connectivity. Thus, continued efforts are required to make Wi-Fi environments more
16
secure. This section lists all the attack types against 802.11 protocols [90] that are
incorporated in AWID, and provides a brief synopsis of the relevant attacks that our
IDS can detect.
According to Kolias et al. [2], attacks against the 802.11 protocols can be di-
vided into three main categories depending on the purpose, target, and methodology.
On the basis of attacker purpose: Key Cracking, Keystream, Denial of Service
(DoS) and M-i-M (Man in the Middle) can be listed.
According to attacker target: client and network are the categories.
In terms of methodology, there are passive, injection, flooding, and imperson-
ation attacks. In key retrieving sub-categories, the attacker tries to reveal the secret
key through a monitoring process of certain packets in the flow of the network traffic.
Then, the attacker proceeds in an oﬄine manner using a key cracking process. Exam-
ples of these types of attacks are FMS, KeroK family, PTW, ARP injection, and Dic-
tionary attacks. Moreover, examples of Keystream retrieving attacks are Chop-chop,
Fragmentation, Caffe-Latte and Hirte attacks. These attacks are one of the many
classes labeled in the AWID-ATK-R that we utilized in our research. Chop-chop is
an attack that was originally implemented against the WEP key. In this attack, the
attacker captures an ARP packet in an attempt to predict the key stream. Then,
it uses the predicted key to forge a new packet which can later be injected into the
network traffic to generate new Initialization Vectors (IVs). The evil twin is an active
attack that works against the wireless access point. In this attack, the attacker sets
up a rogue access point to be a legitimate wireless access point. Here, the rogue access
point gathers privileged and corporate information without the knowledge of the end
user. The cafe latte attack is an active attack. In this attack, the attacker that is in
the radio frequency range of the legitimate network retrieves a WEP key from a client
user. Here, the attacker captures an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packet from
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Table 2.5: AWID data attacks description
Attack Attacker Action
ARP -Injection The attacker cracks the WEP key in an attempt to inject false Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) messages into the network
Chop-Chop The attacker retrieves the last m bytes of the plaintext packet and key stream without having
knowledge of the WEP key
Fragmentation The attacker reveals a significant portion of the key stream and inject packets using the key stream
Caffe Latte The attacker obtains the WEP key from a remote client using the ARP response
Hirte The attacker retries the WEP key using an ARP message and without an AP of the network at all
Disassociation The attacker transmits forged disassociation frames leading to connectivity loss
Deauthentication Broadcast The attacker keeps transmitting forged Deauthentication broadcast frames in its vicinity that results
in loss of the connectivity
Disassociation Broadcast The attacker transmits forged disassociation frames to cause loss of the connectivity
Authentication Request The attacker attempts to exhaust the AP’s resources in an attempt to cause an overflow in the
association table of the client
CTS The attacker transmits the Clear To Send frames constantly and as a result the node will
postpone the routing of messages
RTS The attacker transmits the Ready To Send frames constantly forcing the node to defer the routing
messages
Beacon The attacker utilizing a fake Access Point emits many fake beacon signals that lead to Denial Of
Service because the user cannot connect to the legitimate Access Point
Probe Response The attacker floods the probe packets to exhaust the resources of the Access Point and the client
Evil Twin The attacker brings up a fake AP that advertises the existing Extended Service Set Identification
(ESSID) to a neighbor in the same frequency range
the isolated client. It then manipulates the forged packet and sends it back to the
client. The fragmentation attack exploits the fragmentation process in the network
to perform the attack. Fragmentation attack is similar to chop-chop attack. In frag-
mentation attack, the attacker tries to recover the WEP key by capturing a packet
from the access point. Next, it will use this packet to perform the attack. Table 2.5
provides a brief description of each attack encompassed in the AWID-ATK-R dataset.
2.5.2 Relevant ML-Based IDS Work for AWID Dataset
To start, Kaleem et al. [105] proposed an agent-based malicious detection model
that uses Artificial Neural Network (ANN) for the detection process. The authors
applied their model on the AWID-CLS-R subset to classify each instant either as
normal or a threat. It has been shown that the model provides highly accurate
results (99.3%).
Thing [106] also used the AWID-CLS-R dataset, which has 4 classes. The
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author considered a multi-class classification utilizing a deep learning approach that
achieved an overall accuracy of 98.67% using 154 Features.
Kolias et al. [2] applied 8 conventional supervised machine learning classifiers
to perform the attack classification on the AWID-CLS-R subset. They used the
AdaBoost, J48, Naïve Bayes, OneR, Random Forest, Random Tree and ZeroR al-
gorithms. The authors carried out manual feature selections and incorporated 20
features to train the classifiers. The overall accuracy of their classifiers ranged from
89.43% to 96.2%.
Aminanto et al. [97] proposed a framework for detecting active attacks using a
Stacked Auto Encoder (SAE), which is an unsupervised learning method for feature
selection. The framework used regression layer, a supervised learning technique, with
SoftMax activation function for the classification process. The highest accuracy was
97.7% with 4 classes and 154 features. Moreover, Aminanto et al. [5, 98] employed
three machine learning methods on AWID-CLS-R to select the best features to im-
prove the detection process of impersonation attacks. The authors have eliminated
2 classes out of 4 classes of the AWID-CLS-R and kept two classes which are imper-
sonation attacks and normal traffic classes. They employed Support Vector Machine
(SVM), Artificial Neural Network (ANN), and Decision Tree. ANN was used for the
attack classification. The results show that their approach was 99.86% accurate in
detecting impersonation attacks.
Thanthrige et al. [89, 95] applied 5 supervised machine learning classifier algo-
rithms to perform the attack classification on the AWID-CLS-R and AWID-ATK-R
subsets. The algorithms they used included AdaBoost, J48, OneR, Random Forest
and Random Tree. The selected features were evaluated and ranked by using Infor-
mation Gain and Chi-Square measures. The classifiers were applied on AWID-ATK-R
[2] and AWID-CLS-R [2] with different settings of features based on the feature evalu-
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ation results. The highest achieved accuracy was 95.12% using Random Tree applied
on AWID-CLS-R with a total number of 41 features. In addition, the highest achieved
accuracy was 94.97% using the Random Forest classifier applied on AWID-ATK-R
using the same number of features. The results show that reduced number of fea-
tures (41 features) enhances the accuracy. However, the accuracy decreased when the
authors further reduced the features to 10.
Kolias et al. proposed TermID [96], which is a distributed network intrusion
detection system. TermID uses Classification Rule Induction (CRI) and Swarm Intel-
ligence Optimization (SIP) in an attempt to achieve efficient model training, without
exchanging sensitive data. This system includes: two operational units, the moni-
tor nodes and the central node. The monitor nodes transform the input examples
from their local dataset to intermediate summaries, while the central node performs
reduce operations on the global dataset and runs the main body of the rule construc-
tion process. TermID[96] used the AWID-ATK-F dataset that was manually broken
down and distributed to each node. The authors did not report accuracy. Table 2.6
provides a summary of the related work.
Table 2.6: Summary of work related to AWID
Study Dataset Approach Attributes (Features) Classes Accuracy (%)
Kolias [2] AWID-CLS-R J48 20 4 96.2
Aminanto [98] AWID-CLS-R ANN 154 2 99.86
Aminanto [97] AWID-CLS-R SAE 154 4 97.7
Kaleem [105] AWID-CLS-R ANN 7 2 99.3
Thanthrige [89] AWID-CLS-R Random Forest 111 4 94.83
Thanthrige [89] AWID-CLS-R Random Tree 41 4 95.12
Thanthrige [89] AWID-CLS-R J48 10 4 92.44
Thing [106] AWID-CLS-R Deep Learning 154 4 98.67
Thanthrige [95] AWID-ATK-R Random Tree 111 4 94.58
Thanthrige [95] AWID-ATK-R Random Forest 41 4 94.97
Thanthrige [95] AWID-ATK-R Random Forest 10 4 92.29
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2.6 CICIDS2017 Dataset Structure
The CICIDS2017 dataset [8] consists of realistic background traffic that repre-
sents the network events produced by the abstract behavior of a total of 25 users. The
users’ profiles were determined to include specific protocols such as HTTP, HTTPS,
FTP, SSH and email protocols. The developers used statistical metrics such as min-
imum, maximum, mean and standard deviation to encapsulate the network events
into a set of certain features which include:
(1) The distribution of the packet size
(2) The number of packets per flow
(3) The size of the payload
(4) The request time distribution of the protocols
(5) Certain patterns in the payload
Moreover, CICIDS2017 covers various attack scenarios that represent common
attack families. The attacks include Brute Force Attack, HeartBleed Attack, Botnet,
DoS Attack, Distributed DoS (DDoS) Attack, Web Attack, and Infiltration Attack.
The dataset is publicly available by the authors in two formats:
(1) The full packet payloads in Packet CAPture (PCAP) format
(2) The corresponding profiles and labeled flows as CSV files for machine and deep
learning purposes
2.6.1 Attacks in CICIDS2017
CICIDS2017 was collected based on real traces of benign and malicious activ-
ities of the network traffic. The total number of records in the dataset is 2,830,108.
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The benign traffic encompasses 2,358,036 records (83.3% of the data), while the ma-
licious records are 471,454 (16.7% of the data). CICIDS2017 is one of the unique
datasets that includes up-to-date attacks. Furthermore, the features are exclusive
and matchless in comparison with other datasets.
Table 2.7 highlights the characteristics and distribution of the attacks in the
CICIDS2017 dataset and provides a brief description of each type of attack. CI-
CIDS2017 is a labeled dataset with a total number of 84 features including the last
column corresponding to the traffic status (class label). The features were extracted
by CICFlowMeter-V3 [107]. The output of CICFlowMeter-V3 is a CSV file that in-
cludes: Flow ID (1), Source IP (2) and Destination IP (4), Time stamp (7) and Label
(84). The Flow ID (1) includes the four tuples: Source IP, Source Port, Destination
IP, and Destination Port. Time stamp represents the timing. To the best of our
knowledge, all previous studies that used CICIDS2017 neglect Flow ID (1), Source
IP (2), Destination IP (4), and Time stamp (7). In this work, we used CICIDS2017
with respect to the listed features except the Flow ID (1) and Time Stamp (7). Thus,
in our study, the total number of used features encompasses 82 features including the
Label (84). These features are listed in Table 2.8. The extracted traffic features are
explained in [108].
2.6.2 Relevant ML-Based IDS Work for CICIDS2017 Dataset
This section provides a brief overview of the prior related work that are directly
relevant to CICIDS2017, with a special emphasis on machine learning approaches
that utilize this dataset. It also highlights a sample of previous work that utilize
feature reduction methods in machine learning based IDS.
Sharafaldin et al. [8] used a Random Forest Regressor to determine the best set
of features to detect each attack family. Then, the authors examined the performance
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Table 2.7: CICIDS2017 characteristics, distribution and brief description of each type
of attack
Traffic Type Size Description
Benign 2,358,036 Normal traffic behavior
DoS Hulk 231,073 The attacker employs the HULK tool to carry out a denial of service attack on a web server through generating
volumes of unique and obfuscated traffic. Moreover, the generated traffic can bypass caching engines and strike
a server’s direct resource pool
Port Scan 158,930 The attacker tries to gather information related to the victim machine such as type of operating system
and running service by sending packets with varying destination ports
DDoS 41,835 The attacker uses multiple machines that operate together to attack one victim machine
DoS GoldenEye 10,293 The attacker utilizes the GoldenEye tool to perform a denial of service attack
FTP Patator 7,938 The attacker uses FTP Patator in an attempt to perform a brute force attack to guess the FTP login password
SSH Patator 5,897 The attacker uses SSH Patator in an attempt to perform a brute force attack to guess the SSH login Password
DoS Slow Loris 5,796 The attacker uses the Slow Loris tool to execute a denial of service attack
DoS Slow HTTP Test 5,499 The attacker exploits the HTTP Get request to exceed the number of HTTP connections allowed on
a server, preventing other clients from accessing and giving the attacker the opportunity to open multiple
HTTP connections to the same server
Botnet 1,966 The attacker utilizes trojans to breach the security of several victim machines, taking control of these machines
and organizes all machines in the network of Bot that can be exploited and managed remotely by the attacker
Web Attack: Brute Force 1,507 The attacker tries to obtain privilege information such as password and Personal Identification Number (PIN)
using trial-and-error
Web Attack: XSS 625 The attacker injects into otherwise benign and trusted websites using a web application that sends malicious scripts
Infiltration 36 The attacker utilizes infiltration methods and tools to infiltrate and gain full unauthorized access to the networked
system data
Web Attack: SQL Injection 21 SQL injection is a code injection technique, used to attack data-driven
applications, in which nefarious SQL statements are inserted into an entry field for execution
HeartBleed 11 The attacker exploits the OpenSSL protocol to insert malicious information into OpenSSL memory,
enabling the attacker with unauthorized access to valuable information
Table 2.8: Listed features of network traffic in CICIDS2017.
No. Feature No. Feature No. Feature
1 Flow ID 29 Fwd IAT Std 57 ECE Flag Count
2 Source IP 30 Fwd IAT Max 58 Down/Up Ratio
3 Source Port 31 Fwd IAT Min 59 Average Packet Size
4 Destination IP 32 Bwd IAT Total 60 Avg Fwd Segment Size
5 Destination Port 33 Bwd IAT Mean 61 Avg Bwd Segment Size
6 Protocol 34 Bwd IAT Std 62 Fwd Avg Bytes/Bulk
7 Time stamp 35 Bwd IAT Max 63 Fwd Avg Packets/Bulk
8 Flow Duration 36 Bwd IAT Min 64 Fwd Avg Bulk Rate
9 Total Fwd Packets 37 Fwd PSH Flags 65 Bwd Avg Bytes/Bulk
10 Total Backward Packets 38 Bwd PSH Flags 66 Bwd Avg Packets/Bulk
11 Total Length of Fwd Pck 39 Fwd URG Flags 67 Bwd Avg Bulk Rate
12 Total Length of Bwd Pck 40 Bwd URG Flags 68 Subflow Fwd Packets
13 Fwd Packet Length Max 41 Fwd Header Length 69 Subflow Fwd Bytes
14 Fwd Packet Length Min 42 Bwd Header Length 70 Subflow Bwd Packets
15 Fwd Pck Length Mean 43 Fwd Packets/s 71 Subflow Bwd Bytes
16 Fwd Packet Length Std 44 Bwd Packets/s 72 Init_Win_bytes_fwd
17 Bwd Packet Length Max 45 Min Packet Length 73 Act_data_pkt_fwd
18 Bwd Packet Length Min 46 Max Packet Length 74 Min_seg_size_fwd
19 Bwd Packet Length Mean 47 Packet Length Mean 75 Active Mean
20 Bwd Packet Length Std 48 Packet Length Std 76 Active Std
21 Flow Bytes/s 49 Packet Len. Variance 77 Active Max
22 Flow Packets/s 50 FIN Flag Count 78 Active Min
23 Flow IAT Mean 51 SYN Flag Count 79 Idle Mean
24 Flow IAT Std 52 RST Flag Count 80 Idle Packet
25 Flow IAT Max 53 PSH Flag Count 81 Idle Std
26 Flow IAT Min 54 ACK Flag Count 82 Idle Max
27 Fwd IAT Total 55 URG Flag Count 83 Idle Min
28 Fwd IAT Mean 56 CWE Flag Count 84 Label
of these features with different algorithms that included K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN),
Adaboost, Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP), Naïve Bayes, Random Forest (RF), Itera-
tive Dichotomiser 3 (ID3) and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA). The highest
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precision value was 0.98 with RF and ID3 [8]. The execution time (time to build the
model) was 74.39 seconds. This is while the execution time for our proposed system
using Random Forest is 21.52 seconds with a comparable processor. Furthermore,
our proposed intrusion detection system targets a combined detection process of all
the attack families.
In wireless mesh environments, Vijayan et al. [109] proposed an intrusion detec-
tion system that utilized the genetic algorithm (GA) as a feature selection method and
multiple Support Vector Machines (SVM) for classification. Their system was based
on a linear combination of multiple SVM classifiers, which were ordered based on the
severity of the attacks. Each classifier was trained to detect a certain attack cate-
gory using selected features by the GA. A small portion of the CICIDS2017 dataset
instances were used to evaluate their system. Conversely, we use all the instances of
the CICIDS2017 dataset.
Moreover, authors in [110] compared and contrasted a frequency-based model
from five sequence of aggregation rules with sequence-based modeling of the Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network. The investigation concluded
that the frequency-based model tends to perform similar or better than the LSTM
models in detecting the attacks.
Additionally, the researchers in [111] analyzed the CICIDS2017 dataset using
digital wavelets. Their method efficiently detected service denial attacks of both Slow
Loris and HTTP Denial of Service (DoS).
Furthermore, the authors of [112] applied the Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
classifier algorithm and a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) classifier that utilized
the Packet CAPture (PCAP) file of CICIDS2017. The authors selected specified net-
work packet header features for the purpose of their study. Conversely, we utilized the
corresponding profiles and the labeled flows for machine and deep learning purposes.
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According to [112], the results demonstrated that the payload classification algorithm
was judged to be inferior to MLP. However, it showed significant ability to distinguish
network intrusion from benign traffic with an average true positive rate of 94.5% and
an average false positive rate of 4.68%.
The authors in [113] proposed a denial of service intrusion detection system that
utilized the Fisher Score algorithm for features selection and Support Vector Machine
(SVM), K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and Decision Tree (DT) as the classification
algorithm. Their IDS achieved 99.7%, 57.76% and 99% success rates using SVM,
KNN and DT, respectively. In contrast, this research proposed an IDS to detect
all types of attacks embedded in CICIDS2017 and as shown in Figure 5.10, achieves
100% accuracy for DDoS attacks using (PCA−RF )Mc−10 with UDBB. The authors
in [114] utilized a distributed Deep Belief Network (DBN) as the the dimensionality
reduction approach. Then, the obtained features were fed to a multi-layer ensemble
SVM. The ensemble SVM is accomplished in an iterative reduce paradigm based on
Spark (which is a general distributed in-memory computing framework developed at
AMP Lab, UC Berkeley), to serve as a Real Time Cluster Computing Framework that
can be used in big data analysis [115]. Their proposed approach achieved a value of
F-measure equal to 0.921.
The authors in [116] proposed a Data Dimensionality Reduction (DDR) method.
Their proposed scheme was evaluated by XGBoost (Extreme Gradient Boosting)
[117], SVM (Support Vector Machine), CTree (Conditional inference Trees) [118]
and Neural network (Nnet) classifiers. The number of selected features was 36 and
the highest achieved accuracy was 98.93% with XGboost. Furthermore, the authors
excluded Monday network traffic, which is only benign traffic in their system. This is
while our work was able to achieve accuracy of 99.% with 10 features. In addition, we
kept all the files of the dataset that represent different classes of the network traffic.
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Table 2.9: Summary of previous work related to CICIDS2017
Reference Classifier name F-measure Feature
selection/extraction
(Features Count)
[8] KNN 0.96 Random Forest
RF 0.97 Regressor (54)
ID3 0.98
Adaboost 0.77
MLP 0.76
Naïve Bayes 0.04
QDA 0.92
[112] MLP 0.948 Payload related features
[114] SVM 0.921 DBN
[109] GA+SVM 0.971 GA (40)
[113] KNN 0.997 Fisher Scoring (30)
[119] XGBoost 0.995 (80)
for DoS Attacks
[120] Deep Learning Accuracy (80)
for Port Scan Attacks 97.80
[120] SVM Accuracy (80)
for Port Scan Attacks 69.79
[116] XGBoost Accuracy DDR Features
98.93 Selections (36)
[121] Deep Multi Layer Accuracy Recursive feature
Perceptron (DMLP) 91.00 elimination
for DDoS Attacks with Random Forest
2.7 CIDDS-001 Dataset Structure
The CIDDS-001 (Coburg Intrusion Detection Dataset) [7] is a labeled flow based
dataset that was released in 2017 in a cloud environment based on the OpenStack
platform. CIDDS-001 contains unidirectional NetFlow and was created using an
emulated small business environment which included web-server, E-mail server, and
groups of variant clients. CIDDS-001 encompasses benign and malicious traffic. The
benign traffic simulated a realistic user behavior environment that considers individual
working schedule with various working tasks [122]. The malicious traffic includes
Denial of Service (DOS), Brute Force, and port scan attacks. The first 10 attributes
(features), as tabulated in Table 2.10, are the default NetFlow attributes, and the
last four attributes are additional attributes (description attributes).
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Table 2.10: CIDDS-001 features set
Number Name Description
1 Src IP Source IP Address
2 Src Port Source Port
3 Dest IP Destination IP Address
4 Dest Port Destination Port
5 Proto Transport Protocol (e.g. ICMP, TCP, or UDP)
6 Date first seen Start time flow first seen
7 Duration Duration of the flow
8 Bytes Number of transmitted bytes
9 Packets Number of transmitted packets
10 Flags OR concatenation of all TCP Flags
2.7.1 Attacks in CIDDS-001
The CIDDS-001 dataset includes 43 attacks. 20 attacks were executed in week
1 and 23 attacks were executed in week 2. Week one and week two contain traffic
with benign behavior as well as attacks. Table 2.11 provides more information about
the executed attacks within the CIDDS-001 dataset [122].
Table 2.11: CIDDS-001 attack types
Traffic Status
Normal
SYN Scan
ACK Scan
UDP Scan
FIN Scan
Ping Scan
Port Scan
Brute Force
Dos
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2.7.2 Relevant ML-Based IDS Work for CIDDS-001 Dataset
This section provides a brief overview of prior related IDS work with a special
emphasis on deep and machine learning approaches that utilized CIDDS-001 as the
benchmark dataset.
In the Internet of Things (IoT) environments, Tama et al. [123] used deep neural
networks which combined the grid search strategy to classify attacks. Tama and Rhee
[123] utilized 10 fold cross-validation (10-FCV); repeated cross-validation of 5 repe-
titions each with 2-FCV approaches; in the classification process. The authors split
the data into 5 sub-samples and validated these based on 2-FCV. The sub-samples
were randomly chosen. Thus, the approach may use the same samples that belong
to the majority class of the dataset repeatedly. We consider the class distribution of
instances when applying sampling techniques in our work. This is while Tama and
Rhee’s validation methods [123] did not significantly affect the performance of their
proposed approach.
For Traditional Information Communication System (TICS) environments, He
et al. [124] proposed a Denial of Service (DOS) attack detection system that utilized
nine classification techniques in supervised and unsupervised scenarios. For the su-
pervised cases, Decision Tree (DT), Naïve Bayes, Random Forest (RF), and Support
Vector Machine (SVM) with variant kernel types such as, linear, poly and Radial
Basis Function (RBF) were used. For the unsupervised scenarios, the authors used
K-means classification. The authors extracted the statistical features of four Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that included SSH Brute-force, Dynamic
Domain Server (DNS) Reflection, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Flood,
and Transport Control Protocol (TCP) SYNchronize SYN. They further evaluated
the performance of their proposed system through launching real attacks in lab set-
tings. The experimental results showed that their system was able to detect attacks
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with an accuracy of 99.7% and low false positives of 0.07.
In cloud environments, Idhammad et al. [125] developed a HyperText Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) DDoS attacks detection system based on Information Theoretic
Entropy and Random Forest. The authors estimated the entropy of the network
header features using a time-based sliding window algorithm. In the same manner,
Idhammad et al. [126] proposed a distributed intrusion detection system (IDS) based
on machine learning approaches that utilized the Random Forest classifier to detect
attacks in cloud environments. Their IDS incorporated 5 modules that included a
network traffic module to capture the incoming network traffic on the edge network
routers on a 5-minute time window basis. The suspected traffic at each edge network
router was synchronized to the central server. Then, an ensemble learning classifier
based on Random Forest was used to classify the network traffic on the central storage
server and detect the type of each attack. The authors implemented the system in
Google cloud platform and tested it using the CIDDS-001 dataset.
Nicholas et al. [127] evaluated the performance of Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) utilizing CIDDS-001. They compared the LSTM performance with various
machine learning classifiers.
Verma and Ranga [128] utilized the k-nearest neighbor (KNN) classifier on
CIDDS-001 to build an IDS. Their system achieved an overall accuracy of 99.6% with
2NN and a minimum accuracy of 99.3% with 5NN.
Researchers have not dealt with or treated the imbalanced class distributions of
CIDDS-001 in much detail. The key contributions of this work include highlighting
the importance of imbalanced class problems in network traffic for devising an effective
IDS, and studying the effect of various sampling techniques on the CIDDS-001 dataset
using different classification approaches.
Imbalanced classes; where a particular class is over-represented; can occur in
29
Table 2.12: Summary of work related to CIDDS-001
Study Approach Performance
Tama et al. [123] Deep NN 92.5%
He et al. [124] RF, SVM, DT 99.7%
Idhammad et al. [125] RF+Entropy 98.68%
Nicholas et al. [127] LSTM 97.8%
Verma and Ranga [128] K+2NN 99.6%
many data fusion problems that target data classification [92]. This dissertation
provides novel insights on the imbalanced class distribution concerns in data mining
of big data and suggests approaches on how to tackle this important issue.
2.8 Relevant Imbalanced Class Work in IDS
There is a relatively small body of literature that is concerned with imbalanced
class problems in intrusion detection systems.
Rodda and Erothi [129] analyzed the effect of imbalanced class problems on the
NSLKDD benchmark dataset [130] utilizing Random Forest, J48, Naïve Bayes and
BayesNet classification techniques. The authors did not adopt any of the distribution
balancing methods in their work. This is while in our work, 4 methods are adopted.
In the same manner, Balasubramanian and Joseph [131] studied the affect of
the highly imbalanced NSLKDD dataset. The authors applied two data manag-
ing/balancing methods; namely re-sample with replacements (RWR) and re-sample
without replacements (RWoR). On the other hand, this work adopts the latter and
further applied SMOTE and Class Balancing methods.
Cieslak et al. [132] used the RIPPER classifier and dataset to generate two im-
balanced datasets with SNORT. The authors implemented a combination of oversam-
pling and under-sampling techniques to combat the imbalanced distribution problem
in the collected data. Furthermore, Cieslak et al. [132] applied k-means clustering to
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the minority class followed by SMOTE to each cluster. In contrast, this work used
a benchmark dataset (AWID) and applied SMOTE at once to each of the minority
classes. Furthermore, this work applied the class balancing method as well.
Teshome and Rao [133] examined cost-sensitive methods on the imbalanced
KDDCUP99 and NSLKDD datasets utilizing CS-MC4 and CS-CRT classifiers. This is
while this work examined sampling, synthetic sampling and balancing methods on the
up-to-date Wi-Fi benchmark dataset in addition to Boosting, multi-class classification
(one against all) using Naïve Bayes, and Random Forest classification methods.
Engen [134] evolved the weights of an Evolutionary Neural Network (ENN)
using Genetic Algorithms (GA). Moreover, to accommodate the classification trade-
off of the Evolutionary Neural Network, the authors applied Multi-Objective GA
(MOGA), which treats the classification rate on each class as a separate objective.
To deal with the imbalanced classes in the NSLKDD, Parsaei et al. [135] devel-
oped a hybrid approach that incorporated a combination of SMOTE, Cluster Center
and Nearest Neighbor (CANN) to select the effective features along with a leave one
out method (LOO).
Khor et al. [136] utilized under-sampling and oversampling methods to miti-
gate the skewed class problems in NSLKDD. Khor [136] under-sampled the majority
classes and used SMOTE for oversampling the minority classes. Then, the authors
evaluated the resulted data using Naïve Bayes, Bayesian Networks, ID3, C4.5, and
CART classifiers.
Kotsiantis et al. [137] reviewed various techniques for handling imbalanced
datasets and the relationship between the training set sizes. They concluded that the
minority class is poorly represented for small imbalanced datasets and is not sufficient
for learning, especially when a large degree of class overlapping exists.
Yan et al. [138] proposed a Region Adaptive Synthetic Minority Oversampling
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Technique (RA-SMOTE) to solve the imbalanced problems in NSLKDD. The authors
tested RA-SMOTE using Support Vector Machines (SVM), Back-propagation Neural
Network (BPNN), and Random Forests (RF). A summary of previous work related
to combating imbalanced class distributions is presented in Table 2.13.
Table 2.13: Summary of work related to imbalanced class problems in IDS
Study Dataset Approaches
Rodda and Erothi [129] NSL-KDD Classification
Balasubramanian and Joseph [131] NSL-KDD RWR, RWoR
Cieslak et al.[132] Synthetic dataset of Snort RWR, RWoR ,K-mean+SMOTE
Teshome and Rao [133] KDDCUP99, NSLKDD Classification (CS-MC4,CS-CRT)
Engen [134] KDDCUP99 Classification (MOGA)
Parsaei et al.[135] NSL-KDD SMOTE+CANN
Khor et al. [136] NSL-KDD RWR, RWoR, SMOTE
Kotsiantis et al. [137] NSL-KDD RWR, RWoR
Yan et al. [138] NSL-KDD RA-SMOTE
Tama et al. [123] CIDDS-001 10 and 2 fold cross validation
2.9 Cyber Physical Systems (CPS)
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) [139] are configured from the integration of
computational algorithms and physical components. Such CPS systems include large
public infrastructures such as water treatment plants, smart grids, and transportation
system, as well as physically smaller systems or devices such as pacemakers or insulin
pumps [140]. Given the potential for cyber-attacks, it is prudent to design mechanisms
for detecting and defending a CPS against either cyber-attack or physical attacks. A
cyber-attack attempts to disturb the communication network of a CPS, whereas a
physical attack is an attempt to tamper with the physical elements of a CPS such as
insulin sensor and pumps, etc. This section of the dissertation is focused on Medical
Cyber Physical Systems (MCPS) that monitor the patient’s health through various
medical devices.
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2.10 Relevant CPS Work
Behavior-specificationâbased intrusion detection is a form of behavior-based
intrusion detection that does not leverage user, group, or data profiling within a sys-
tem. Instead, security system experts create rules that reflect legitimate behaviors of
a system. Here, an IDS will measure a node’s misbehavior according to the node’s
deviation from the specified rules of a system. This process allows for lightweight in-
trusion detection to be deployed into systems with severe resource constraints where
data profiling is difficult. Specification is a set of rules and thresholds that define
the expected behavior for network components such as nodes, protocols, and routing
tables. Specification-based approaches detect intrusions when network behavior de-
viates from specification definitions. Several attempts have been made to build an
intrusion detection system that applies specification-based rules to detect intruders.
In 2005, DaSilva et al. [47] proposed an IDS that used seven types of traffic-
based rules to incorporate interval, integrity, and delay parameters to detect intruders.
Cheung et al. [141] studied a behavior specificationâbased IDS that used the
Prototype Verification System (PVS) to transform protocol, communication pattern,
and service availability specifications into a format compatible with EMERALD [142]
and Snort [143]. The authors audited the fields of Modbus packets. In particular,
Cheung et al. ensured individual fields fall within the valid ranges and relationships
between fields are preserved. This study lacks any numerical results.
By 2011, Carcano et al. [144] introduced an IDS that applied critical state anal-
ysis and state proximity to monitor the evolution of the targeted system’s states to
detect intruders. Furthermore, Mitchell and Chen [145] proposed IDS’s for aerospace
and smart utility (power) applications, respectively. These are all behavior-specification-
based approaches driven by a state machine based upon behavior rules created by
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security experts.
Additionally, Li et al. [146] built an intrusion detection system for a smart grid
CPS that factored behavior rules of line meter devices. They monitored the device’s
behaviors to determine whether the smart grid CPS violated the normal behavior.
In works related to MCPS, Asfaw et al. [147] proposed an anomaly-based IDS
for these systems. The authors focused on attacks that violated privacy of the targeted
systems; whereas, in our case study experiment, we focused on attacks that violated
the integrity of MCPS. Asfaw et al. [147] used an anomaly-based approach while we
applied a specification-based rules approach. Also, Asfaw et al. [147] did not provide
numerical results in the form of false negatives or positives.
Yang and Hwang [148] introduced a fraud and abuse detection approach for
healthcare applications. Our research, on the other hand, focuses on the treatment,
rather than the administrative domain of healthcare. Furthermore, Yang and Hwang
used an anomaly-based approach, while we used a specification-based rules approach.
They provided numerical results that measured the internal validity. However, they
did not provide externally valid metrics such as the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC).
Furthermore, Mitchell and Chen [149] proposed an IDS for medical applications.
The authors used behavior-specification-based approaches driven by a state machine
derived from behavior rules constructed by security experts. Moreover, they con-
sidered seven threshold monitoring approaches: Binary, Hamming, Manhattan, Eu-
clidean, LCS, Levenshtein, and Damerau-Levenshtein. The authors created a dataset
for good nodes and bad nodes using Monte Carlo simulation. Mitchell and Chen
assumed the nodes were corrupted from several types of attackers such as reckless
and random attackers. Mitchell and Chen considered command injection, greyhole
and exfiltration attacks.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND
MILESTONES
3.1 Machine Learning-Based IDS
In the literature, there are a number of intrusion detection systems that are
developed based on machine learning techniques. Machine learning techniques can
predict and detect threats before they result in major security incidents. In general,
the structure of a machine learning IDS, as highlighted in Figure 3.1 is composed of
Pre-processing, Features reduction/selection, Classification and Evaluation. One of
Figure 3.1: Generic structure of Machine Learning-Based IDS
the most well-known methods in machine learning for assessing the detection process
in various domains is classification. Classification can be defined as the process of
grouping or categorizing an object according to shared characteristics and features.
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Classification is either supervised or unsupervised. When the dataset is labeled, then
the preferred classification techniques are the supervised ones. To be more specific,
some studies apply single learning techniques, such as random forest, multilayer per-
ceptron, support vector machines and genetic algorithms. On the other hand, some
systems are based on combining different learning techniques, such as voting, stack-
ing and ensemble techniques [150]. In particular, these techniques are developed as
classifiers, which are used to classify or recognize whether the incoming traffic is the
normal traffic or malicious. Some systems employ feature reduction and/or feature
selection prior to classification. As a result, the performance of an IDS is significantly
improved when the features are more discriminative and representative. Moreover,
the huge network traffic and high-dimensional features lead to prolonged classification
processes, whereas, low-dimensional features can shorten these processes.
3.2 Feature Selection
Feature selection is the most important procedure for any machine learning
based IDS. Moreover, they are useful for reducing model complexity, which leads to
faster learning and real-time processes.
From our literature review that is relevant to AWID Datatset [2], two of the
reported intrusion detection systems applied manual features selection, whereas one
study used Correlation based Feature Selection (CFS) [98]. Moreover, a study by
Thanthrige used Chi-Square and Information Gain [89, 95]. Information Gain eval-
uates the worth of a feature by measuring the information gain with respect to the
class, whereas Chi-Square evaluates the worth of a feature by computing the value of
the chi-squared statistic with respect to the class.
Furthermore, Aminanto [98] used the C4.5 algorithm as a feature selection
method. This method belongs to the family of decision-tree based algorithms and is
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an extension to the well-known decision tree induction algorithm [151]. In addition,
Aminanto [98] used the correlation attribute evaluator (Corr), which evaluates the
worth of an attribute (feature) by measuring the its correlation with the class.
Figure 3.2 illustrates features selection methods, some, along with their classi-
fiers, for existing IDS’s that utilized the AWID dataset.
In our dissertation and for AWID [2], we use search algorithms such as Harmony
search, Best First search, Bee search, and Ant Colony search in combination with fea-
ture set evaluators such as Cost sensitive and Correlation features subset evaluators.
The following sections give a brief explanation of the feature selection techniques.
Figure 3.2: Statistics of relevant ML methods in AWID
3.2.1 Harmony Search (HS)
A well-known technique for effective features selection is the Harmony Search
(HS) algorithm [152]. The Harmony Search (HS) algorithm is one of the meta-
heuristic algorithms that mimics the improvisation process of music players [153].
One advantage of HS is that it avoids the problem of imposing complicated mathe-
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matical requirements and it is not sensitive to the initial value settings [154] [155].
The HS method encompasses two phases: initialization and iteration. In the ini-
tialization phase, the HS parameters are defined, the memory is filled with random
harmonics, and the harmonics are evaluated. In the iteration phase, a new harmony
is improvised and evaluated. Based on the evaluation, either the new Harmony is
discarded or it is replaced by the worst harmony in the harmony memory, and the
harmony memory is therefore updated [152].
3.2.2 Ant-Colony Search
The Ant Colony Optimization algorithm [156] is a probabilistic technique that
can be utilized as a feature selection technique which explores the features space [157,
158]. AntSerach uses two components to guide the search process for the pheromone
value and the heuristic information.
3.2.3 Bee Search Algorithm
The Artificial Bee Colony, developed by D. Karaboga, is a Swarm Intelligence
algorithm used to solve optimization problems in several research areas such as in-
trusion detection systems. Bee Search algorithm [159, 158] has the ability to explore
the space of features and evaluate the subset of features.
3.2.4 Best First Search (BFS)
The Best First Search, searches the space of feature subsets by greedy hill climb-
ing augmented with a backtracking facility [160]. Setting the number of consecutive
non-improving nodes allowed, controls the level of backtracking done. The BFS may
start with the empty set of features and search forward, or start with the full set
of features and search backward, or start at any point and search in both directions
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(through considering all possible single attribute/feature additions and deletions at a
given point) [158].
3.2.5 Correlation Feature Subset Evaluate
The Correlation feature Subset Evaluate (CfsSubsetEval), evaluates the worth
of a subset of attributes by considering the individual predictive ability of each feature
along with the degree of redundancy between them. Subsets of features that are highly
correlated with the class while having low inter-correlation are preferred [25, 161].
3.3 Feature Reduction
For decades, researchers used dimensionality reduction approaches [162, 163,
164] for different reasons such as to reduce the computational processing overhead,
reduce noise in the data, and for better data visualization and interpretation. One
common dimensionality reduction approach is the Missing Value Ratio (MVR) ap-
proach [165]. The MVR approach is efficient when the number of missing values is
high. For the CICIDS2017 dataset, the number of missing values is near zero. There-
fore, we excluded the Missing Value Ratio approach. Other common approaches
include the Forward Feature Construction (FFC) and Backward Feature Elimination
(BFE) approaches [165]. Both FFC and BFE are prohibitively slow on high dimen-
sional datasets, which is the case for CICIDS2017 (>2,500,500 instances). As a result,
we did not discuss these approaches. The PCA technique, on the other hand, is rela-
tively computationally cost efficient, can deal with large datasets, and is widely used
as a linear dimensionality reduction approach [162, 166]. The auto-encoder dimen-
sionality reduction approach is an instance of deep learning, which is also suitable
for large datasets with high dimensional features and complex data representations
[167].
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This work adopts AE as well as PCA for features dimensionality reduction. One
of the most fundamental differences between AE and PCA in terms of dimensionality
reduction is that in the auto-encoder approach, there is no assumption of linearity in
the data. The auto-encoder optimizer figures out the function through the weights
that best encode the data under the specified reconstruction error metric. This is
while the PCA assumes linearity in the set of reduced data [168].
3.3.1 Auto Encoder Based Feature Reduction
In this section, we present the sparse auto-encoder learning algorithm [169,
170], which is one approach to automatically learn feature reduction in unsupervised
settings. Figure 3.3 shows the structure of the auto-encoder. The input vector x =
(x1, x2, ..., xn) is first compressed to a lower dimensional hidden representation that
consists of one or more hidden layers a = (a1, a2, ..., am). The hidden representation
a is then mapped to reproduce the output xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, ..., xˆn). Let j be the counter
parameter for the neurons in the current layer l, and i be the counter parameter for
the neurons in the previous hidden layer l− 1. The output of a neuron in the hidden
layer can be represented by the following formula.
a
(l)
j = f(z
(l)
j ) = f(
n∑
i=1
W
(l−1)
ji .a
(l−1)
i + b
(l−1)
j ) (3.1)
The size of the weight matrix of the hidden layer is represented by W ∈ Rm×n
and the bias is b ∈ Rm. A sigmoid function is chosen as the activation function, such
that f(z) = 1
(1+exp−z) . Parameters W and b are optimized using back propagation, by
minimizing the cost function J for all the training instances [171], as follows:
J(W, b; xˆ, x) =
1
k
k∑
i=1
(
1
2
||xˆ− x||2) + 1
λ
ls−1∑
l=1
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
(W
(l)
ji )
2 (3.2)
Parameter λ is chosen to control the regularization term of all the weights in
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Figure 3.3: The structure of an AE.
a particular layer, and ls denotes the total number of layers. To impose a sparsity
constraint on the hidden units, one strategy is to add an additional term in the loss
function during training to penalize the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between a
Bernoulli random variable with mean ρ and a desired sparsity mean ρˆj.
ρˆj =
1
k
k∑
i=1
[
a
(i)
j (x
(i))
]
(3.3)
where a(i)j denotes the activation of hidden unit j in the auto-encoder and k is the
training sample [172].
Jsparse (W, b) = J(W, b; xˆ, x) + β
m∑
j=1
KL (ρ || ρˆj) (3.4)
This sparsity is guaranteed to have the effect of causing ρˆj to be close to ρ,
because it ensures that the sparse activations are achieved on the training data for
any given units in the hidden layer. The value of β is chosen to control the weight of
the sparsity penalty term.
The computational complexity of executing the designed auto-encoder with a
single hidden layer depends on the dimensionality of the input vector n, and the
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Reduction ratio R ∈ (0, 1) [173].
O(n. (R× n) + (R× n) .n) = O(Rn2 +Rn2) = O(n2) (3.5)
In this dissertation, a two hidden-layer sparse auto-encoder is used with sigmoid
activation functions and tied weights. The input layer has 81 neurons which equals
the total number of features in the CICIDS2017 dataset. The first hidden layer of
the sparse auto-encoder was able to successfully reduce the dimensions to 70 features
with a good error approximation. Further, the features were reduced to 64 in the
second hidden layer. Once the weights are trained, the resulting sparse auto-encoder
can be used to perform the classification in the final stage. The parameters of the
sparse representation are set as follows: the weight decay λ = 0.0008. The weights
are multiplied by λ to prevent the weights from growing too large. The sparsity
parameter ρ = 0.05, and the sparsity penalty term β = 6. The sparsity parameters
and penalty are designed to restrict the activation of the hidden units, which reduces
the dependency between the features. The algorithm is summarized in Table 3.1 and
the design principles are presented in Table 3.2.
3.3.2 Principal Component Analysis Analysis (PCA) Based Fea-
ture Reduction
In this section, we present the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) algorithm.
The objective of PCA is to perform dimensionality reduction. PCA finds a transfor-
mation that reduces the dimensionality of the data while accounting for as much
variance as possible. PCA is the oldest technique in multivariate analysis. The fun-
damental concept of the PCA is the projection-based mechanism. Here, the original
dataset X ∈ Rn with n columns (features) is projected into a subspace with k or lower
dimensions representation X ∈ RK (fewer columns), while retaining the essence of
the original data. The algorithm works as follows:
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Table 3.1: Pseudo-code for the proposed Auto-Encoder.
Dimensionality Reduction Using AE
Training:
1. Perform the feedforward pass on all the training
instances and compute
a(1), a(2) Equation (3.1)
2. Compute the output, sparsity mean,
and the error of the cost function
J(W, b; xˆ, x) Equation (3.2)
ρˆj Equation (3.3)
3. Compute the cost function of the sparse auto-encoder
Jsparse(W, b) Equation (3.4)
4. Backpropagate the error to update the weights and
the bias for all the layers
Dimensionality Reduction:
Compute the reduced features from the hidden layer
a(1) Equation (3.1)
Table 3.2: Design Principles
Parameters Value Description
λ 0.0008 Weight decay
β 6 Sparsity penalty
ρ 0.05 Sparsity parameter
To reduce the features dimensionality from n-dimensions to k-dimensions, two
phases are implemented; the preprocessing phase and the dimensionality reduction
phase. In the preprocessing phase, (steps 1 through 4 below), the data is preprocessed
to normalize its mean and variance using Equations (3.6) and (3.7). In the second
phase (steps 5 through 8), which represent the reduction phase, the covariance matrix
CovM , Eigen-vectors and Eigen-values are calculated from Equations (3.8) and (3.9).
(1) Normalize the the original feature values of data by its mean and variance
using Equation (3.6), where m is the number of instances in the dataset and
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X(i) are the data points.
µ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
X(i) (3.6)
(2) Replace X(i) with X(i) − µ.
(3) Rescale each vector Xj(i) to have unit variance using Equation (3.7).
σ2j =
1
m
∑
i
(Xj(i))
2 (3.7)
(4) Replace each Xj(i) with
Xj(i)
σ
.
(5) Compute the Covariance Matrix CovM as follows:
CovM =
1
m
∑
(X(i))(X(i))
> (3.8)
(6) Calculate the Eigen-vectors and corresponding Eigen-values of CovM .
(7) Sort the Eigen-vectors by decreasing the Eigen-values and choose k Eigen-
vectors with the largest Eigen-values to form W .
(8) Use W to transform the samples onto the new subspace using Equation (3.9).
y = W T ×X (3.9)
where X is a d × 1 dimensional vector representing one sample, and y is the
transformed k × 1 dimensional sample in the new subspace.
The computational complexity of executing the designed PCA depends on the
number of features P that represent each data point [174].
O(P 3) (3.10)
According to [175], the Reduction Ratio (RR) of PCA can be defined as the
ratio of the number of target dimensions to the number of original dimensions. The
lower the value of RR, the higher is the efficiency of PCA.
44
3.4 Classification
There are various types of classifier models that have been developed and used
for different types of applications and in different fields of science. Each of these
algorithms has its unique characteristics while others share the same concept. The
process of choosing a certain type of classifier model may affect the final accuracy
result, time to build the model, and detection rate. Figure 3.4 summarizes previous
studies that used AWID to design an IDS with different classification algorithms.
From this Figure, we notice that approximately 17% of the IDS methods use classi-
fication schemes that are based on Artificial Neural Network (ANN) classifiers. Next
are Random Forest, J48, OneR, ZeroR, and AdaBoost (11% for each classifier), 6%
based on Voting and Extra Tree, and 5% based on Random Tree. Finally, approx-
imately, 5% are non-classification (associative rule) based. In the remainder of this
section we highlight the eleven classifiers that we used in the classification process.
Figure 3.4: Statistics of relevant ML classification methods in AWID
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3.4.1 Artificial Neural Network (ANN)
ANN is a learning algorithm built for information processing through mathe-
matical or computational models. There are different types of ANNs, such as Multi-
layer Perceptron (MLP), and Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ). However, a neural
network (NN) is typically a number of interconnected neurons in which each connec-
tion has a weight associated with it. During the classification process, it can predict
the correct class label of the input layer by modifying the weights. In general, the NN
consists of an input layer, one or more hidden layers and an output layer. The choice
of selecting the number of hidden layers is different and depends on each application.
In practice, one layer is usually used [176]. Generally, the architecture of ANN uses
different layers.
3.4.2 Naïve Bayes (NB)
Naïve Bayes (NB) is a statistical classifier based on the Bayes theorem with
robust probabilities and assumptions. It is a simple probabilistic based machine
learning classifier that was introduced in 1960. It incorporates Bayes theorem to
perform classification, and can predict class probabilities by a given tuple belonging
to a specific class. The assumption of a Bayesian classifier is called class conditional
independence, which means each feature value of a specific class has independent
effects from other feature values. Theoretically,it is a superior classifier that can
guarantee high classification speed and accuracy when applied to large databases
[177].
3.4.3 Random Forest (RF)
Random Forest, introduced by Leo Breiman in 2001 [178, 179], is a multiple
decision tree based algorithm. Random forest creates many classification trees to
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classify new inputs. Hence, it applies the input vector to each of the trees in the
forest and then selects a class that most of trees produced [179]. Random Forest
algorithm runs efficiently on large data sets. Furthermore, Random Forest can carry
many input variables as well as it efficiently handles large percentage of missing data
while maintaining accuracy [180]. The computing time required to establish the RF
classification model is [181, 182]:
T ×
√
MN log (N) (3.11)
where T is the number of trees, M is the number of variables used in each split,
and N is the number of training samples.
3.4.4 Bagging
Bagging is a machine learning ensemble meta-algorithm [183]. This type of
algorithm is designed to improve the stability and accuracy of machine learning al-
gorithms used in statistical classification and regression. The Bagging (bootstrap
aggregating) is a meta-algorithm. This technique reduces the variance while retain-
ing the bias, which improves the accuracy of a single model through using multiple
copies of it trained on different sets of data. The bagging technique can overcome
over-fitting by reducing prediction variance.
3.4.5 AdaBoost
The AdaBoost algorithm, introduced by Freund and Schapire, is the first and
the most commonly used boosting algorithm [184]. AdaBoost is being used in ap-
plications of numerous fields such as intrusion detection systems [23, 24]. Through
boosting, AdaBoost improves the performance by combining many relatively weak
and inaccurate rules generated by other learning algorithms. These other learning
algorithms are referred to as weak learners or base learner components. The weak
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learner is used to generate a hypothesis for each sample in the training dataset. Ad-
aBoost combines weak hypotheses generated by weak learners in many rounds to
generate improved hypothesis [23].
3.4.6 Simple Logistic
This classifier is used to build a linear logistic regression model. Here, boosting
classifier with simple regression functions are used as base learners to fit the logistic
models [185].
3.4.7 LogitBoost
LogitBoost is a boosting classification algorithm. LogitBoost and AdaBoost
are close to each other in the sense that both perform an additive logistic regression.
The difference is that AdaBoost minimizes the exponential loss, whereas LogitBoost
minimizes the logistic loss [184].
3.4.8 OneR
OneR is a rule based classification algorithm. It is a very simple classification
algorithm based on a single rule; constructing a frequency table for each predictor
against the target, for each predictor in the data. It then selects the rule with the
smallest total error as its "one ruleâ. OneR ranks features (attributes) of the train-
ing dataset using error rate and selects the most informative attribute to develop a
rule that predicts the class of the data [186]. The OneR algorithm requires discrete
attributes. If not, they are discretized.
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3.4.9 Random Tree
The Random Tree algorithm is a tree-based classification algorithm. It employs
a single tree for data classification and it uses randomly selected number of attributes
(say K) at each node of the tree for the classification. The random forest classifier is
an ensemble method usually applied to Random Tree.
3.4.10 ZeroR
ZeroR is the simplest classification method which relies on the target and ignores
all the predictors. The ZeroR classifier simply predicts the majority category (class).
ZeroR can be used to determine the baseline performance as a baseline classifier
for other classification methods [187]. Both ZeroR and OneR classifiers consider a
frequency table to predict a class. The difference is that OneR depends on both the
frequency table and one constructed rule from the frequency table.
3.4.11 J48
J48 is a Decision Tree (DT) based classification algorithm introduced by Ross
Quinlan. DT is a nonlinear classifier that has been mainly used for solving problems
related to machine learning and classifier systems [188]. The learning and classifica-
tion steps of such algorithms are simple, fast and can handle multi-dimensional data.
In addition, it can work with noisy data and missing data in a database [189]. The
concept of DT classifiers is a flowchart-like tree structure in which each decision dis-
cards a certain class until reaching the accepted class. It consists of nodes, branches,
and leaves. A node denotes a test on an attribute using transition rules, a branch
represents the result of the test, and the leaf holds a class label.
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3.4.12 Linear Discrimination Analysis (LDA)
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is a method used in machine learning to
find a linear combination of features that characterizes or separates two or more classes
of instances. The resulting combination may be used as a linear classifier. LDA is also
closely related to principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis in that they
both look for linear combinations of variables which best explain the data [168]. LDA
explicitly attempts to model the difference between the classes of data. The LDA is a
type of Bayesian classifier. The LDA assumes the same
∑
for all classes. Essentially,
LDA computes a separate µ for each class (using training points that belong to it),
but
∑
is computed using the entire training data. This common covariance matrix
is used in the computations corresponding to every class.
3.4.13 Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA)
A Quadratic classifier is used in machine learning to separate measurements of
two or more classes of instances by a quadratic surface. QDA is a type of Bayesian
classifier. QDA computes a separate
∑
and µ for each possible output class.
3.5 Imbalanced Class Handling Approaches
The problem of learning from skewed multi-class datasets is an important topic
that arises very often in practice in classification problems [190]. In such problems,
almost all the instances are labelled as one class, while far fewer instances are labeled
as the other class or other classes; usually the more important class. According to
[191], the Imbalance Ratio (IR) can be defined as the ratio of the number of instances
in the majority class to the number of instances in the minority class, as presented
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in Equation 3.12.
Imbalance Ratio =
Majority Class Instances
Minority Class Instances
(3.12)
Nowadays, imbalanced class distribution is a major hurdle. If the IR value in
the data is high, classifiers will be lower in accuracy and reliability; i.e. they do not
truly reflect the classes accurately. Furthermore, imbalanced class distribution is an
inevitable problem in real traffic due to the large size of traffic and low frequency of
certain types of anomalies.
The following section, provides brief description of the common approaches
for handling imbalanced datasets [190], which include : re-sample with replacement
(RWR), re-sample without replacement (RWoR), SMOTE (Synthetic Minority Over-
sampling), and Class Balancing (or class balancer).
3.5.1 Balancing Approaches at Data Level
The aim of these approaches is to balance and normalize the class distribution
before passing the dataset to the classifier. Sampling is the most commonly used
approach for overcoming miss-classification problems due to imbalanced datasets.
The basic approaches at data level are explored further next:
3.5.1.1 Re-Sample Without Replacement (RWoR)
Re-Sample Without Replacement is a non-heuristic method that aims to balance
class distribution through the random elimination of majority class samples. The
rationale behind it is to try to balance out the dataset in an attempt to overcome the
idiosyncrasies of the machine learning algorithm. This technique produces a random
sub-sample of a dataset [192].
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Figure 3.5: A taxonomy of imbalanced class handling approaches
3.5.1.2 Re-Sample With Replacement (RWR)
Random over-sampling is a non-heuristic method that aims to balance class
distribution through the random replication of minority class samples [193]. This
approach can increase the likelihood of occurring over-fitting [193], since it makes
exact copies of the minority class samples. This way, a symbolic classifier, for instance,
might construct rules that are apparently accurate, but actually cover one replicated
example. In addition, oversampling can introduce an additional computational task
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if the dataset is already fairly large, but imbalanced.
3.5.1.3 Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE)
This approach generates synthetic minority examples (samples) to over-sample
the minority class [194]. Its main idea is to form new minority class examples by
interpolating between several minority class examples that lie together. For every
minority example, its k (which is set to 5 in SMOTE) nearest neighbors of the same
class are calculated, then some examples are randomly selected from them according
to the over-sampling rate. After that, new synthetic examples are generated along
the line between the minority example and its selected nearest neighbors. Thus, the
over-fitting problem is avoided and causes the decision boundaries for the minority
class to spread further into the majority class.
3.5.2 Distribution Based Balancing (DBB)
This section provides a glance at the distribution based balancing (DBB) tech-
nique [195]. DBB is based on learning and sampling probability distributions. In this
technique, the sampling of instances is performed following a distribution learned for
each pair example of feature and class label. More specifically, the user determines
the distribution balancing type to learn in order to re-sample new instances. Accord-
ing to [191], the Imbalance Ratio (IR) can be defined as the ratio of the number of
instances in the majority class to the number of instances in the minority class, as
presented in Equation 3.12.
For the CICIDS2017 dataset, IR is 5:1 and the total number of classes is 15
classes. To apply Uniform Distribution Based Balancing (UDBB) [196], a uniform
number of instances (IResample) for each class is calculated from Equation 3.13. The
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pseudo-code is presented in Table 3.3.
IResample =
Number of Instances in the dataset
Number of Classes in the dataset
(3.13)
Table 3.3: UDBB pseudo-code
Input Training Set: DTrain
Set Distribution to Uniform
C : Number of Classes
FT : Total number of features in DTrain Training Set
Iold : Total number of Instances in DTrain
Calculate the required number of Instances in each class: IResample
Training Set DTrainnew = ∅
For each class Ci Do
While i 6= IResample
For each feature F1, ..., FT
Generate new sample using uniform distribution
Assign Class label
Return DTrainnew
3.5.3 Balancing Approaches at Algorithm Level
The balancing approaches at algorithm level include adjusting the costs of the
various classes so as to counter the imbalanced classes, adjusting the class weight,
adjusting probabilistic estimate at the tree leaf, adjusting the decision threshold, and
one vs. all. This dissertation applies the adjusting class weight and the one vs. all
approaches.
3.5.3.1 Adjust Class Weight: Class Balancing (CB)
This approach re-weights the instances in the data so that each class has the
same total weight. The total sum of weights across all instances will be maintained.
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3.5.3.2 One-Vs-All (OVA)
OVA decomposition divides an m class problem into m binary problems. Each
problem is faced by a binary classifier, which is responsible for distinguishing one of
the classes from all other classes. The learning step of the classifiers is done using the
whole training data, considering the patterns from the single class as positives and
all other examples as negatives [15].
3.6 IDS for Cyber Physical System
Behavior-based detection approaches can benefit CPS because these systems
can deliver a well-defined concept of cognitive processes, which can exploit its consis-
tent behavior. The expectant detection techniques must have the ability to identify
real attacks from random defects, ingrained defects in the design, misconfiguration of
the system devices, system faults, human errors, and software implementation bugs.
Therefore, state estimation is an effective method to adopt for CPS’s.
3.6.1 Hardware Based Behaviour Rules IDS
A medical device is defined as an instrument used alone or in combination with
other instruments to monitor and treat human beings for one or more of specific
medical conditions [197, 140]. Different device models are networkable and can send
their output to a central monitoring station, from which healthcare personal process
the medical data simultaneously. Medical devices are often characterized and con-
trolled by sophisticated patient treatment algorithms that interact with the physical
environment and the patient [149]. The most prominent characteristic of a medical
device is its feedback loop that reacts to the physical environment. For example, in
portable, wearable and transportable devices such as Continuous Glucose Monitor
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Table 3.4: Malicious behavior rule in CNF
Device Malicious State States Components
PCAg (Analgesic Request = TRUE)Λ(Pulse <T) Analgesic Request, Pulse
PCAg (Analgesic Request = TRUE)Λ(Respiration <T) Analgesic request, Respiration
CD (Analgesic Infusion Rate >0) Λ (Mode=Defibrillator) Analgesic Infusion Rate and CD Mode
CD (Mode =PACEMAKER)Λ (|Pulse− PacemakerFrequency|)δF CD Mode, Pulse
VSM |Monitor Temperature− Trustee Temperature| >δT Temperature
VSM |Monitor Respiration− Trustee Respiration| >δR Respiration
CGM Insulin Request Rate >T Insulin Request Rate
CGM (Insulin Request = TRUE) Λ (Pulse <T) Λ (Glucose <T) Insulin Request Rate, Pulse, Glucose
(CGM), the actual device transmits the patient’s data via a wireless data connec-
tion. Other devices such as Vital Sign Monitor (VSM) and Patient Control Analgesia
(PCAg) which are non-portable, non- wearable and non-transportable, can send their
output using wireline communication to a central monitoring station inside a hospital.
This is while other medical devices such as Cardiac Devices (CD) are implanted in the
patient and do not use wireline communication. In this section, four types of medical
devices are studied. This dissertation introduces a hardware approach implementing
lightweight IDS monitoring tools for VSM, PCAg, CD, and CGM devices that can be
mapped onto an FPGA chip which can then be embedded into the medical device.
Furthermore, this research proposes behavior rules for a CGM device, and transforms
these behavior rules to state machines to build the hardware module. The hardware
module uses the set of behavior rules along with the related readings and settings of
sensors and actuators to detect if a device’s behavior deviates from the expected nor-
mal behavior. It provides an output to distinguish among system states that are safe,
unsafe, warning, and idle. Tables 3.5 and 3.4 present the set of normal behavior rules
and malicious behavior rules in the Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) representation.
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Table 3.5: Normal behavior rule in CNF
Description Safe State Trustee Monitor
Pulse above threshold during analgesic request (Analgesic Request = TRUE) Λ(Pulse >Ts) PCAg VSM
Analgesic request rate below safe threshold Analgesic Request Rate >Ts PCAg VSM
Pulse matches pacemaker frequency Pulse = Pacemaker Frequency CD VSM
Patient is unstable before defibrillation (Pulse <Ts) Λ (Respiration <Ts) Λ (CD Mode = Pacemaker) CD VSM
Trustee blood pressure matches monitor Trustee blood pressure = Monitor blood pressure VSM Peer VSM
Trustee oxygen saturation matches monitor Trustee oxygen saturation =Monitor oxygen saturation VSM Peer VSM
Glucose above threshold during insulin request (Insulin Request = TRUE) Λ (Glucose >Ts) VSM Peer VSM
Insulin request rate below safe threshold (Insulin Request Rate <Ts ) GSM VSM
3.6.2 Transforming Behavior Rules to State Machines
In the process of transforming behavior rules to state machines, the "malicious
behavior state" is identified as a result of a behavior rule being violated [140] [198].
Thus, the initial step is to identify malicious behavior for a specific device as a state.
This state is then converted into the Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) predicate and
identifies the involved state components in the underlying state machine. Following
that, a Boolean expression in the Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) is used to group
together all the extracted malicious behavior states that are related to each device,
as shown in the following DNF:
CGM. (Insulin Request Rate >T ) ∨ ((Insulin Request = TRUE) ∧ (Pulse < T) ∧
(Glucose <T )) ∨ ((Insulin Request = TRUE) ∧ (Respiration <T ) ∧ (Glucose <T ))
∧ (|Monitor Glucose− Trustee Glucose| >δ)
A disjunctive normal form (DNF) can be defined as a normalization of a logical
formula. It can also be described as an OR of ANDs, a sum (∨) of products (∧), or
(in philosophical logic) a cluster concept [199]. Next, the union of all the predicate
variables is converted into state components of a state machine to establish their
corresponding ranges. Finally, the managing process will collapse and identify the
sequence of values that are not legitimate in order to reduce the total number of
states in the states’ space. Table 3.6 indicates the symbols used in this study.
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Table 3.6: Symbols used
Symbol Parameters Note
T Threshold value Each value is tied to a specific device system
state (warning, unsafe), and
certain state component
δ Sensor Reading Deviation Each value is tied to a specific device specific
patient, and specific system states
(warning, unsafe, safe)
L Acceptable Low Heart Rate Pulse Each value is tied to a specific device
specific system state, and patient
H Acceptable Low Heart Rate Pulse Each value is tied to a specific device
specific system state, and patient
Ts Safe threshold value This value is tried to a specific device
specific patient, and specific system state (safe)
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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVALUATION
This chapter outlines the plan for: i) implementing and testing the proposed
intrusion detection framework; mainly the software-based machine learning ides and
the expected outcomes and objectives of the this approach. The work is implemented
using the WEKA 3.9 and Python programming tools; and ii) implementing and test-
ing the medical CPS IDS.
4.1 Software Machine Learning Based IDS
In this section, we present our experimental study plan and procedure. The
feature selection and reduction ideas, as well as different balancing techniques and
various classifiers have been applied on different benchmark IDS datasets.
4.1.1 AWID
As shown in Figure 4.1, our procedure starts with locating and eliminating
redundant and unnecessary features in AWID-ATK-R. Once the features were chosen,
it was necessary to perform preprocessing, followed by normalization. In the follow-
up steps of the experimental study, different methods were used to select the optimal
feature sets. To obtain the sets, several known machine learning classifiers were
trained to identify the most efficient ones. The final stage of the study included testing
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the trained classifier models. In the following subsections, each step is presented in
more detail.
Figure 4.1: Proposed intrusion detection based on the AWID dataset
The AWID-ATK-R-Trn dataset was used to train the machine learning tech-
niques and the AWID-ATK-R-Tst dataset was used to evaluate the performance of
the machine learning techniques.
4.1.1.1 Preprocessing
Preprocessing is a vital component in the machine learning experiments and
plays a key role in the classifier model as well as enhancing the overall classification
performance. To begin this process, we determine the feature types of the dataset
which include numerical and non-numerical data. To be more specific, the service set
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identifier (SSID) feature is a non-numerical feature. It is a string. Other features are
numeric. This work has traditionally employed a simple preprocessing stage were the
hexadecimal values in AWID are transformed into integer representation. After the
preprocessing step, the features’ scales within the dataset were heavily imbalanced.
Thus, normalization was applied on the selected sets.
4.1.1.2 Unity-Based Normalization
In this section, we use Equation 4.1 to re-scale the features in the dataset based
on the minimum and the maximum values of each feature. Some features in the
dataset vary between [0, 1] while other features vary between [0, ∞). Therefore,
these features were normalized to restrict the range of the values between 0 and 1.
xi =
xi − xmin
xmax − xmin (4.1)
where xi is the value of a particular feature, xmin is the minimum value, and xmax is
the maximum value.
4.1.1.3 Feature Selection Procedures
Some of the features are vital for intrusion detection, whereas other features
may act as noise; causing a negative impact on the training speed and the accuracy.
Therefore, in the first step of our experiments, a total of 32 attributes were selected
based upon reliable and accurate manual attribute selection and recommendation
from previous related work [91, 200]. Cited work [201] ranked the most important
attributes as those related to the MAC header. In addition, in previous studies of
wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDS), certain attributes have been found to
be related to the intrusion detection process [2, 89, 98, 202]. Table 4.1 shows the 32
attributes group set (32-AGS), also noted as 32 features set group (32-FSG).
In the second step, we used the Correlation Feature Selection (CFS) mea-
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Table 4.1: AWID 32-FSG
Feature Name Feature Name
epoch Time wlan.fc.pwrmgt
frame.time_delta wlan.fc.protected
frame.time.relative wlan.duration
frme.len wlan.ra
frame.ignored wlan.da
radiotap.mactime wlan.ta
radiotap.channel.type.cck wlan.sa
radiotap.dbm_antsignal wlan.bssid
wlan.fc.type_subtype wlan.seq
wlan.fc.type wlan_mgt.fixed.listen_ival
wlan.fc.subtype wlan_mgt.fixed.timestamp
wlan.fc.ds wlan_mgt.fixed.beacon
wlan.fc.retry wlan_mgt.fixed.reason_code
wlan_mgt.tim.dtim_period wlan_mgt.tagged.all
wlan.wep.iv wlan.wep.key
wlan.wep.icv data.len
sure [25] to evaluate the attributes space along with the Best First Search method
of forward direction [160], which is a heuristic search strategy to evaluate the at-
tributes and select the highly class-correlated ones, yet uncorrelated to one another.
Based on that, 10 attributes were selected. These attributes are listed as follows:
frame.time.relative, frame.len, radiotap.channel.type.cck, wlan.fc.subtype, wlan.fc.dc,
wlan.fc.pwrmgt, wlan.ta, wlan.seq, wlan.wep.iv, and data.len.
In the third step, we used the Harmony Search (HS) algorithm [152] which is
one of the meta-heuristic algorithms that mimics the improvisation process of music
players. One advantage of HS is that it avoids the problem of imposing compli-
cated mathematical requirements and it is not sensitive to the initial value settings
[152]. Here, we incorporate the HS algorithm with the Cost Sensitive Subset Eval-
uator (CostSensitiveSubsetEval), which is a meta subset evaluator that makes its
base subset evaluator cost-sensitive [203]. The algorithm takes a cost matrix and a
62
base evaluator. If the base evaluator can handle instance weights, then the train-
ing data is weighted according to the cost matrix, otherwise the training data is
sampled according to the cost matrix. Based on this, a 7 Attributes Group Set (7-
AGS) was selected that is consisted of radiotap.mactime, radiotap.channel.type.cck,
wlan.fc.subtype, wlan.fc.pwrmgt, wlan.bssid, wlan.seq, and data.len.
Finally, we used the CFS algorithm along with the Harmony Search technique
[152], based upon which, the 5 Attributes Group Set (5-AGS) was selected. The list
of this 5-AGS are epoch.time, frame.len, wlan.duration, wlan.ra, and data.len.
4.1.2 CICIDS2017
We utilized the up-to-date CICIDS2017 intrusion detection and prevention
dataset [8], which consists of five separated data files. Each file represents the net-
work traffic flow and specific types of attacks for a certain period of time. To be more
specific, the dataset was collected based on a total of 5 days, Monday through Friday.
Monday is the normal day and only includes the benign network traffic, whereas the
implemented attacks in the dataset were executed on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday
and Friday. This dissertation combined all CICIDS2017’s files together and fed them
through the AE and PCA units for a compressed and lower dimensional representa-
tion of all the fused data. Figure 4.2 displays the idea of the proposed framework.
4.1.2.1 Preprocessing
In this study, a preprocessing function is applied to the CICIDS2017 dataset
by mapping the IP (Internet Protocol) address to an integer representation. The
mapped IP includes the Source IP Address (Src IP) as well as the Destination IP
Address (Dst IP). These two are converted to an integer number representation. This
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Figure 4.2: Anomaly-based intrusions detection on CICIDS2017
study splits the data into training set and testing set with a ratio of 70:30.
4.1.2.2 Unity-Based Normalization
In this step, we use Equation 4.1 to re-scale the features in the dataset based
on the minimum and maximum values of each feature. Some features in the original
dataset vary between [0, 1] while other features vary between [0,∞). Therefore, these
features are normalized to restrict the range of the values between 0 and 1, which are
then processed by the auto-encoder for feature reduction.
4.1.2.3 Features Reduction Procedures
This dissertation accustoms Auto-Encoder (AE) [88],[196],[204],[205],[206],[207]
and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for dimensionality reduction [196],[208],[205]
and [164],[209]. Then, these reduced features are utilized to develop of a framework
for netflow based intrusion detection.
4.1.3 CIDDS-001
This section outlines the essential steps of our methodology and experimental
procedures on the CIDDS-001 dataset. See Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Experimental procedure applied on the CIDDS-001 intrusion dataset
4.1.3.1 Preprocessing
In this experiment, a simple preprocessing stage was deployed where the hex-
adecimal values in the dataset are transformed into integer representation. Since after
this step, the features’ scales within the dataset were heavily imbalanced, normaliza-
tion was applied on the selected sets to bring the ranges between 1 and -1.
4.1.3.2 Experimental Procedures
This section explains in detail the experimental procedure. This research utilizes
the following machine learning classification approaches for intrusion detection in
binary classification on the CIDDS-001 benchmark dataset:
• Deep Neural Networks (DNN) with adaptive learning rates and architectures
as tabulated in Table 4.2
• Random Forest (RF)
• Voting technique to vote on OneR, Naïve Bayes, ExtraTree
• Stacking technique with Linear discriminant analysis (LDA), Naïve Bayes, and
OneR
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Table 4.2: Proposed DNN architecture
Classifier #of Layers #of Neurons in each layer Learning Rate
DNN (3,512,0.1) 3 512 0.1
DNN (3,1024,0.1) 3 1024 0.1
DNN (3,2048,0.1) 3 2048 0.1
Moreover, we carried out our experiments using two scenarios: With Handling
Imbalanced Class Distribution (WHICD), and Without Handling Imbalanced Class
Distribution (WoHICD). In the WHICD scenario, we apply sampling techniques to
handle class distribution of the CIDDS-001 before feeding the data to the classifiers.
In the WoHICD scenario, we apply the machine learning classifiers to the original
class distribution. We compare and contrast the two scenarios for the classifiers.
The techniques [210] that we employed on CIDDS-001 to handle imbalanced class
distributions include the following:
• Up-sampling the minority class
• Down-sampling the majority class
• Spread Sub-Sample
• Class Balancer
Up-sampling [211] is defined as the procedure of randomly duplicating instances from
the minority class in order to reinforce its signal. This is while Down-sampling [211]
involves randomly removing observations from the majority class to prevent its signal
from dominating the learning algorithm. The Spread Sub-Sample technique produces
a random sub-sample of the dataset. The technique allows to specify the Distribu-
tion Spread, which is the the maximum class distribution spread that represents the
maximum "spread" between the minority and majority classes. To illustrate, it may
specify that there be at most a 2:1 difference in class frequencies. In our experiments,
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we set the distribution spread to a uniform distribution (Distribution Spread=1). Fi-
nally, the Class Balancer re-weights the instances in the data so that each class has
the same total weight. Moreover, the total sum of weights across all instances will be
maintained. In our experimental procedure, we keep the original distribution for the
test dataset as is without applying any of the handling imbalanced class techniques
since the status of the network flow traffic tends to have skewed towards normal traf-
fic. Table 4.3 shows the CIDDS-001 class distribution before and after the imbalanced
class handling (balancing) approaches [92].
Table 4.3: CIDDS-001 class distribution
Handling Imbalanced Class Approach No. of Instances
Attack Normal
Spread Sub-Sample 58,360 58,360
Down-Sample the Majority Class 58,359 1,508,500
Up-Sample the Minority Class 1,508,499 1,508,500
Original Distribution 58,359 2,958,640
4.2 Hardware Behavior Rules Based Co-Design
Four medical devices were employed in our research for the MCPS case study
[140]. The proposed Behavior Specification Rule Monitoring (BSRM) tool is based on
a set of behavior rules that have been determined and designated during the debug-
ging and operational phases to specify acceptable behaviors of sensors and actuators
embedded in medical devices such as VSM, PCAg, CD and CGM. Accordingly, BSRM
will identify whether each medical device’s behavior is normal or malicious according
to the set of behavior rules. The observations are composed from the audit data that
were represented by the logs generated by the relevant sensor or actuator drivers, the
MIMIC-III [212] Dataset, and the University of Queensland vital signs Dataset [213].
The test bench incorporates different acceptable parameter ranges that reflect the
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physiology and responses for patient treatment related to each device’s state com-
ponents. BSRM operates through individual medical devices, since BSRM has no
designated monitoring node, there is no single point of failure. In a VSM example,
one VSM is monitored by another peer VSM for security purposes. In a PCAg, one
PCAg is being monitored by a VSM and a peer PCAg.
4.3 State Transition Diagram
The normal behavior states as well as the malicious behavior states are used to
build a state transition diagram for each specified device’s behavior monitoring tool.
The state components related to the designated state machine of our model are shown
in Table 4.5. We use these state components along with both normal and malicious
behavior rules, sensors and actuators readings, and settings to build an idealized
model of a finite state machine engine in Hardware Description Language (HDL) for
monitoring each device’s behavior. Each designed state diagram consists of four states
that include: Idle, Safe, Unsafe, and Warning state. Table 4.6 indicates the number
of the device states and the reasons why the device entered such states. It is worth
to mention that the unsafe state of the state machines are not those "hazardous"
states generated due to design faults (e.g. software bugs). Such "hazardous" states
are removed as a result of the design faults that were identified during the testing and
debugging phases. In our research, the safe states and unsafe states are permanent
and are based on either malicious or normal behavior in a specific medical device. The
idle state represents the initial status of the system module. Through an asynchronous
reset signal, the system can be forced to enter this state. During system initialization,
this state is added to the Finite State Machine (FSM) of the system. Furthermore,
the system is in a warning state as long as its specified parameters exceed the warning
threshold for at least one behavior rule. This state may indicate an earlier sign of
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malicious behavior or represents a slight difference in readings of the two related
sensors due to environmental influences such as indoor noise. Moreover, a safe state
represents normal behavior of the specified device and indicates that the system
follows its designated normal behavior rules. On the contrary, an unsafe state reflects
malicious behavior. Figure 4.4 shows a state transition diagram of a device’s behavior
pattern.
Figure 4.4: State machine diagram
The following explanations have been added to illustrate and describe the ma-
licious behaviors in the medical devices under analysis.
One state could be when the PCAg device acts as a trustee, while the VSM device acts
as a monitor. Here, when the PCAg device receives the patient’s request for analgesic
to relieve pain, the PCAg device will distribute the necessary analgesic according to
the patient’s request. Once the patient receives pain relief, the patient’s vital signs
displayed on the VSM device would return to a relaxed state. One can infer that all
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of the patient’s vital signs are stable. However, if the PCAg device is compromised
through malicious behavior, then the PCAg device will continuously administer the
analgesic, and the final result would be an overdosed patient. Therefore, if the PCAg
continues to receive additional requests for analgesic while a patient’s pulse or res-
piration rate is below a normal threshold, then malicious behavior is present in this
device. Furthermore, if the analgesic request rate of the PCAg device exceeds nor-
mal threshold, then malicious behavior is present. It is imperative to differentiate
between physical button presses from a patient in pain from those requests that the
PCAg device actually generates. The PCAg device should only fulfill requests within
a normal threshold. If a PCAg device fulfills requests too frequently, then malicious
behavior is present. In addition, another scenario when the PCAg device acts as a
trustee and the VSM acts as a monitor occurs as the PCAg device administers a pain
relief dosage with a certain infusion rate to a cardiac patient who has an implanted
CD in the defibrillation mode. This state includes two components: the infusion rate
and the CD mode. As the device being evaluated transitions from one state to an-
other, the VSM can determine if both states are either safe or malicious, depending
on the infusion rate and CD device mode. To illustrate further, when a PCAg device
has an infusion rate R in the range (0,100%) and the cardiac device mode, M , is in
defibrillation, the monitor can check to see if (R0,M0) and (R1,M1) are both safe
states.
4.4 Recognizing State Components and Ranges
In order to complete the synthesis process, our research quantized the contin-
uous components related to the sensors and actuator readings based on an integer
scale that fell within admissible ranges. The complete list of the admissible ranges
for the state components is essential.
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Table 4.5: State component in the designed state machine
Name Attribute Range Component Device
Analgesic Request Reading True, False Sensor PCAg
Pulse Reading [0,240 bpm] Sensor VSM
Respiration Reading [0,60 bpm] Sensor VSM
Analgesic Request Rate Reading [0,4/hour] Sensor PCAg
Blood Pressure Reading [0,240 mmHg] × [0,160 mmHg] Sensor VSM
Oxygen saturation Reading [0,100%] Sensor VSM
Temperature Reading [32,42 ◦C] Sensor VSM
Analgesic Infusion Rate Control [0,100%] Actuator PCAg
Mode Control Passive, Pacemaker, Defibrillator Sensor CD
Pacemaker Frequency Control [0,240 bpm] Actuator CD
Insulin Request Reading True, False Sensor CGM
Insulin Request Rate Reading [0,4/hour] Sensor CGM
Glucose Reading [0,200 mg/dL] Sensor CGM
Insulin Infusion Rate Control [0,100%] Actuator CGM
4.4.1 VSM Device
In VSM devices, the state components include pulse rate, respiration rate, tem-
perature, blood pressure, and pacemaker frequency. According to the admissible
ranges for these states, the normal pulse rate range falls within [0, 240 bpm] yielding
241 values; the normal respiration rate range falls within [0, 60 bpm] yielding 61
values; the normal temperature range falls within [32, 42 ◦C] yielding 11 values; the
normal blood pressure range falls within [0, 240 mmHg] × [0, 160 mmHg] yielding
241 × 161 values; and the normal pacemaker frequency range falls within [0, 240
bpm] yielding 241 values. Therefore, the total values of all the states is equivalent to:
241 × 161 × 241 × 161 × 101 × 101 × 241 × 241 × 61 × 61 × 11 × 11 = 4.16 × 1023
states.
As demonstrated, the resulting states’ space for each device is huge, and a re-
duction technique is necessary to reduce the total number of states. From a medical
point of view; our research reduces the states’ space by eliminating the values of spe-
cific state components that are related to each device. For example, in a VSM device,
we define three values that are relevant for pulse rate, respiration rate, temperature,
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blood pressure, and pacemaker frequency. These are normal, beyond warning thresh-
old, and beyond unsafe threshold. In addition to the standard states’ components
connected to each device, we monitor specific state components for each device.
4.4.2 PCAg Device
Similarly, in PCAg devices, the state components encompass of analgesic re-
quest, respiration rate, analgesic request rate, and analgesic infusion rate. According
to the normal admissible ranges for these states: an analgesic request is [0, 1] yield-
ing 2 values; the respiration rate is [0, 240 bpm] yielding 241 values; the analgesic
request rate is in [0, 4] yielding 5 values; and the analgesic infusion rate is [0, 100]
yielding 101 values. Therefore, the total value of all the states is equivalent to :
2× 241× 5× 61× 5× 101× 3 = 4.454× 107 states.
As demonstrated, the resulting states’ space for each device is huge, and a
reduction technique is necessary to reduce the total number of states. From a medical
point of view; our research reduces the states’ space by eliminating the values of
specific state components that are related to each device. For example, in the PCAg
device, we define the values that are relevant for an analgesic infusion rate. Also, the
two values that are relevant for the analgesic request are zero or greater than zero,
and the two values that are relevant for insulin request are zero or greater than zero.
4.4.3 CD Device
Likewise, in CD devices, the state components comprise of the pacemaker fre-
quency, oxygen saturation level, pulse rate, and CD device mode. According to the
normal admissible ranges for these states, the pacemaker frequency range is [0, 240
bpm] yielding 241 values; the oxygen saturation level range is [0,100] yielding 241
values; the pulse rate’s range is [0, 240 bpm] yielding 241 values; and in an active CD
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device the mode is either defibrillation or pacemaker which yields 3 values (taking in
consideration the active mode of the CD device). Therefore, the total value of all the
states is equivalent to: 241× 101× 241× 3× = 1.760× 107 states.
The resulting states’ space for each device is huge, and a reduction technique
is necessary to reduce the total number of states. Our research reduces the states’
space by eliminating the values of specific state components that are related to each
device. In a CD device, we define the values that are relevant for oxygen saturation
levels. Also, we define the values that are relevant for the CD device’s mode.
4.4.4 CGM Device
In the same manner, for CGM devices, the state components consist of an
insulin request, glucose level, insulin request rate, insulin infusion rate, and pulse
rate. The admissible ranges for these states incorporate an insulin request that is
either true or false and falls within the range of [0, 1] yielding 2 values; the glucose
level is in the range of [0, 200] yielding 201 values; insulin request rate is in the range
of [0, 2] yielding 3 values; insulin infusion rate is in the range of [0,100] yielding 101
values; and the pulse is in the range of [0, 240 bpm] yielding 241 values. Therefore,
the total value of all the states is equivalent to: 3× 201× 3× 101× 241 = 9.785× 106
states.
As can be seen, the resulting states’ space for the CGM device is also huge, and
a reduction technique is necessary to reduce the total number of states.
Through our research, we found that the resulting states’ space for the VSM
device is equivalent to 3 × 3 × 3 × 3 × 3 = 243 states. In the PCAg device, it is
equivalent to 2× 3× 3× 3× 2× 3 = 324 states, in the CD device it is equivalent to
3 × 3 × 3 × 3 = 81 states. Lastly, the resulting states’ space in the CGM device is
equivalent to 2× 3× 3× 2× 3 = 108 states.
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Table 4.6: Number of states and cause for each particular state
State VSM PAC CD CGM Cause
Safe 1 50 4 3 The monitor and trustee readings match for all the specified
related components as described in Table 4.5
Warning 31 80 23 57 The monitor and trustee readings differ by more than the
warning margin for at least one of the specified related
components but not more than the unsafe threshold
for any of the components as described in Table 4.5
Unsafe 211 194 54 48 At least one of the specified related components differs
by more than the unsafe threshold as described in Table 4.5
Idle 1 1 1 1 Initial State of the system
Using ranges 244 325 82 109 The ranges were limited according to the medical prospect
Without ranges 4.016 ×1023 4.454 ×107 1.760 ×107 9.785 ×106 The ranges were comprised of wide ranges of Natural numbers.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS, DISCUSSIONS AND
COMPARISONS
In this chapter, we present the principal findings of the designed experiments,
both the machine learning based IDS designs in software and the software and hardware-
based MCPS IDS co-designs.
5.1 Machine Learning Based IDS Results
All the work for the experiments was carried out using Intel Core i7 3.30 GHz, 16
GB RAM system running Windows 10 and the Waikato Environment for Knowledge
Analysis (Weka) software.
The proposed feature selection ideas were based on four groups of selected fea-
tures tested on the AWID dataset. The results obtained from the analysis of the
performance of classifiers with 32-FSG, 10-FSG, 7-FSG and 5-FSG are summarized
hereafter. To evaluate the performance of these selected feature groups, several ma-
chine learning classification algorithms were applied to train and test the data. The
classifiers were trained and tested and the average accuracy was recorded. We tested
different classifiers performance, since a certain classifier might yield better perfor-
mance compared to others. There is no best machine learning classifier because a set
of machine learning models that work very well in one domain may work poorly in
another. Hence, to ensure that the IDS model is pragmatic and feasible in real-world,
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we performed tests using various types of classifiers and determined the best one that
covers the wide variety of attacks included in the AWID. Moreover, based on our sur-
vey, no previous studies have considered cross validation approaches for testing the
different classifiers. The chosen classifiers applied to the proposed selected feature
set groups in this study with AWID include OneR, ZeroR, Random Forest, Random
Tree, Bagging, Logit Boost, Simple Logistic J48 , and NN, which are among the most
commonly used ones based on our survey.
The feature reduction approaches were examined on the CICIDS2017 dataset
as well as AWID, and balancing techniques were applied along with various classifiers
on different benchmark IDS datasets (e.g. AWID, CICIDS2017 and CIDDS-001).
5.1.1 Performance Evaluation Metrics
In this work, we evaluate performance with multi-class and binary class datasets.
In the literature, most of the performance measures are designed only for two-class
problems. Based on the True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP)
and False Negative (FN) values, the following set of metrics are used to evaluate the
performance of IDS classifiers.
This study used various performance metrics to evaluate the performance of the
proposed ideas for IDS, including False Alarm Rate (FAR), Matthews Correlation Co-
efficient (MCC) [12], F-Measure [19], Detection Rate (DR), and Accuracy (Acc) as
well as the processing time (in seconds). The definition of these metrics are provided
below.
(1) False Alarm Rate (FAR) is a common term which encompasses the number of nor-
mal instances incorrectly classified by the classifier as an attack and can be estimated
through Equation 5.1.
FAR =
FP
TN + FP
(5.1)
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(2) Accuracy (Acc) is defined as the ability measure of the classifier to correctly
classify an object as either normal or attack. The Accuracy can be defined using
Equation 5.2.
Acc =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(5.2)
(3) Detection Rate (DR) indicates the number of attacks detected divided by the
total number of attack instances in the dataset. DR can be estimated by Equation
5.3.
DR =
TP
TP + FN
(5.3)
(4) F-measure (F-M) is a score of a classifier’s accuracy and is defined as the weighted
harmonic mean of the precision and recall measures of the classifier. F-Measure is
calculated using Equation 5.4.
F -Measure = 2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
(5.4)
(5) MCC is the Matthews Correlation Coefficient and can be thought as a measure
of the quality of classification [12]. MCC is calculated using Equation 5.5.
MCC =
(TP × TN)(FP × FN)√
(TP + FP )(TP + FN)(TN + FP )(TN + FN)
(5.5)
(6) Moreover, this dissertation studies the Kappa statistic metric [16] for multi-class
classification. According to Mikel et al. [15], one way to calculate the Kappa statistic
metric is by making use of the resulting confusion matrix in the classification task.
From this matrix, Kappa statistic is computed from Equation 5.6 as follows:
Kappa =
n
∑m
i=1 hii −
∑m
i=1 TriTci
n2 −∑mi=1 TriTci (5.6)
where hii is the cell count in the main diagonal (the number of true positives for each
class), n is the number of samples, m is the number of class labels and Tri and Tci
are the total number of rows and columns, respectively.
77
(7) Precision (Pre.) represents the number of positive predictions divided by the total
number of positive class values predicted. It is considered as a measure for the clas-
sifier exactness. A low value indicates large number of False Positives. The precision
is calculated using Equation 5.7.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(5.7)
(8) Recall (Rec.) is the number of True Positives divided by the number of True
Positives and the number of False Negatives. Recall is considered as a measure of a
classifier completeness such that a low value of recall realizes many False Negatives
[214, 215]. Recall is estimated through Equation 5.8.
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(5.8)
(9) The geometric [216] (G-mean) for multi-class problems is a higher root of the
product of recall for each class [217], which is estimated using Equation 5.9:
(
K∏
i=1
Ri
) 1
K
(5.9)
where Ri denotes the recall of class Ci.
5.2 Multi-class Combined Performance Metric
Basically, the overall accuracy is used to measure the effectiveness of a classifier.
Unfortunately, in presence of imbalanced data, this metric may fail to provide ade-
quate information about the performance of the classifier. Furthermore, the method is
very sensitive to the class distribution and might be misleading in some way. Hamed
et al. [20] proposed a combined performance metric to compare multiple binary clas-
sifier systems. However, their solution neglects class distribution and can work only
for binary classification systems.
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Table 5.1: Proposed CombinedMc metric calculation pseudo-code
Calculate CombinedMc with respect to Class Distribution
Feed Confusion Matrix CM
For i =1 to C
Calculate the total number of FP for Ci as the sum of values in the ith column excluding TP
Calculate the total number of FN for Ci as the sum of values in ith row excluding TP
Calculate the total number of TN for Ci as the sum of all columns and rows excluding ith row and column
Calculate the total number of TP for Ci as the diagonal of the ith cell of CM
Calculate the total number of instances for Ci as the sum of the ith row
Calculate the total number of instances for Ci as the sum of the ith row
Calculate the total number of instances in the dataset as the sum of all rows
Calculate Acc using Eq. 5.2, DR using Eq. 5.3, and FAR using Eq. 5.1 for each class Ci
Calculate the distribution of each Ci using Eq. 5.11
i ++
Calculate CombinedMc using Eq. 5.10
In this dissertation, we propose the Multi-Class Combined performance metric
CombinedMc with respect to class distribution so that it can compare multiple multi-
class classification systems as well as binary class systems through incorporating four
metrics together (Accuracy 5.2, Detection Rate 5.3, FAR 5.1, and class distribution
5.11). The Multi-Class Combined performance metric can be estimated using the
following equation 5.10.
CombinedMc =
C∑
i=1
λi
(
Acci +DRi
2
− FARi
)
(5.10)
where C is number of classes, and λi is the class distribution, which can be estimated
using the following formula:
Class Distribution =
Total number of instances in each class
Total number of instances in the dataset
(5.11)
The result of this metric will be a real value between -1 and 1; in other words,
CombinedMc ∈ [1,−1]; where−1 corresponds to the worst overall system performance
and 1 corresponds to the best overall system performance. Table 5.1 illustrates the
pseudo-code for calculating this proposed combined metric.
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5.3 Results and Discussion - AWID
5.3.1 32-FSG
As seen from Table 5.2, the highest result of accuracy with 32-FSG was 99.64%
for the Random Forest algorithm, whereas, the lowest was 66.64% for Simple Logis-
tic. Here, the classifier fails to classify some of the attacks included in AWID. This
algorithm is a function-based algorithm and changing the activation function may
enhance the Simple Logistics’ accuracy. Table 5.2 also compares the FP rate results
from the analysis of the classifiers. The highest FP rate was 0.933 for the Naïve Bayes,
whereas, the lowest FP rate was 0.04 for the Logit Boost classifier. The classifiers
also resulted in significantly high Precision and Recall values. Logit boost reported
the highest Precision and Recall value of 0.996. It is apparent from Table 5.2 that
the highest result of the F-Measure value was 0.996 for the Logit Boost classifier.
This is compatible with the resulted Accuracy, Precision and Recall for the same
classifier. Moreover, the area under ROC curve is another good metric to compare
the performance of the classifiers. Here, higher values indicate better performance.
The obtained results indicate that the ROC curve area for ZeroR is the lowest value
of 0.5. Nonetheless, Random Forest and Logit Boost show high ROC curve areas of
0.993 and 0.991, respectively. Moreover, the Area under Precision-Recall curves are
better to highlight the differences between models for highly imbalanced datasets.
5.3.2 10-FSG
This subsection presents the results for the second feature set group. First, a
comparison of the resulted accuracy is shown in Table 5.3. For the 10-FSG the Naïve
Bayes achieved the highest accuracy of 99.14%. Multi- layer Perceptron CS, which is
a function based algorithm, achieved an accuracy of 91.21% with the 10-FSG. Second,
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as presented in Table 5.3, the FP Rates of different classifiers are compared. What
stands out from this Table is that, the majority of the classifiers achieved a high
FP Rate, which is not a good indication. However, the Naïve Bayes, Logit Boost
and AdaBoost achieved lower values of 0.083, 0.314, and 0.132, respectively for the
FP Rate. In addition, the F-Measure is an important metric that has the ability to
reflect whether or not the values of precision or recall excel from each other. For the
10-FSG, all the classifier models reported an F-measure value greater than 0.928.
5.3.3 7-FSG
In this section, we present the principal findings of the experiments relevant to
7-FSG. Table 5.4 presents a comparison of the Accuracies, FP rate, Precision, Recall,
ROC Area, PRC Area, F-Measure, MCC, and Time to build the model among the
classifier models. The highest values are shown in purple.
5.3.4 5-FSG
In this section, we present the principal findings of the experiments relevant to
5-FSG. Table 5.5 presents a comparison of the Accuracies, FP rate, Precision, Recall,
ROC Area, PRC Area, F-Measure, MCC, and Time to build the model among the
classifier models. The highest values are shown in purple.
5.3.5 7-FSG Cross Validation
To further examine the 7-FSG we ran the experiments using the 10-fold cross
validation approach to validate the obtained results. The cross-validation results are
set out in Table 5.6. The highest values are highlighted. The Random Forest reports
an accuracy of 99.99%.
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Table 5.6: Performance evaluation of the cross validation approach using 7-FSG
Classifier Accuracy (%) TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure MCC ROC Area PRC Area Time
Random Forest 99.99 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 178.53
J48 99.99 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6.58
Simple Logistic 98.92 0.989 0.049 0.989 0.989 0.988 0.936 0.996 0.992 407.77
Bagging 99.99 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 41.81
Naïve Bayes 97.37 0.974 0.11 0.986 0.974 0.978 0.853 0.995 0.998 0.72
OneR 96.49 0.965 0.345 0.939 0.956 0.951 0.739 0.812 0.937 0.83
Multi-Layer Perceptron CS 99.74 0.997 0.019 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.984 0.996 0.998 1202.98
Table 5.7: Performance evaluation of the cross validation approach using 5-FSG
Classifier Accuracy (%) TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure MCC ROC Area PRC Area Time
J48 99.99 1 0 1 1 1 0.999 1 1 5.51
OneR 96.50 0.965 0.342 0.939 0.965 0.951 0.739 0.812 0.937 0.89
Random Forest 99.99 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Naïve Bayes 97.33 0.974 0.011 0.986 0.974 0.978 0.853 0.995 0.998 0.59
Bagging 99.99 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 298.41
Simple Logistic 98.76 0.988 0.08 0.983 0.988 0.985 0.917 0.995 0.991 1407.3
Multi-Layer Perceptron CS 99.65 0.997 0.021 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.981 0.996 0.997 1603.38
5.3.6 5-FSG Cross Validation
To further examine the 5-FSG, we ran the experiments using the 10-fold cross
validation approach to validate the obtained results. The cross-validation results are
set out in Table 5.7. Theis Tables illustrates that the maximum obtained accuracy
was 99.99% using the Random Forest classifier. Furthermore, the resulted FP Rate
for J48 and Bagging was the lowest value of 0, which is the best result. Conversely,
the OneR classifier achieved the highest FP Rate of 0.342. The Precision values range
from a maximum value of 1 to a minimum value of 0.939.
Furthermore, a visualization of the AWID-ATK-R-Trn and AWID-ATK-R-Tst
based on 2 PCA Components analysis is shown in Figures 5.1 and Figure 5.2, respec-
tively.
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Figure 5.1: 2D Visualization of PCA on AWID-ATK-R-Trn
Figure 5.2: 2D Visualization of PCA on AWID-ATK-R-Tst
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5.3.7 Handling Imbalanced Class Distributions in AWID
This section presents the effect of applying imbalanced class handling approaches
on AWID. The effect of applying different balancing techniques on the 32-FSG, 10-
FSG, 7-FSG, and 5-FSG is displayed in Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11, respectively.
5.3.8 Performance Comparison - AWID
The following paragraph compares our experiments with previous related works
that used the AWID dataset. We must note that comparison with other studies is
challenging because of the differences in the Full and Reduced version of the AWID
dataset.
Thanthrige et al. [95] [89] achieved the highest accuracy of 94.97% using Ran-
dom Forest with 41 features (attributes). In addition, when they reduced the at-
tributes to 10, the results showed that the accuracy decreased from 94.97% to 92.29%
for Random Forest. This is while our study achieved 99.99% accuracy using Random
Forest with 7-FSG and 5-FSG. We were also able to achieve a minimum accuracy
of 94.93% with the Simple Logistic classifier using 7-FSG and a higher accuracy of
99.44% with the Bagging approach using 7-FSG.
Tables 5.12 highlights a comparison of previous studies with our study on the
AWID dataset. The table shows that our study achieved the maximum accuracy of
99.99%. As demonstrated from the results, the selected attributes (features) impact
positively upon our classifier models. To be specific, attributes such as epoch.time,
frame.time.relative, and wlan.fc.pwrmgt are essential and effective to detect attacks
such as Caffe latte, Hirte, Honeypot and Evil twin [88] [95]. This is while large
features sets may result in over-fitting problems, and optimal attribute/feature set
selection reduces the processing time, which is crucial for real-time applications.
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Table 5.12: Summary of the work related to AWID dataset
Study Dataset Approach Attributes Classes Accuracy (%)
Alotaibi [218] AWID-CLS-R Majority voting 21 4 92.36
Kolias [2] AWID-CLS-R J48 20 4 96.2
Aminanto [98] AWID-CLS-R ANN 154 2 99.86
Aminanto [97] AWID-CLS-R SAE 154 4 97.7
Kaleem [105] AWID-CLS-R ANN 7 2 99.3
Thanthrige [89] AWID-CLS-R Random Forest 111 4 94.83
Thanthrige [89] AWID-CLS-R Random Tree 41 4 95.12
Thanthrige [89] AWID-CLS-R J48 10 4 92.44
Thing [106] AWID-CLS-R Deep learning 154 4 98.67
Thanthrige [95] AWID-ATK-R Random Tree 111 4 94.58
Thanthrige [95] AWID-ATK-R Random Forest 41 4 94.97
Thanthrige [95] AWID-ATK-R Random Forest 10 4 92.29
Our Study AWID-ATK-R Random Forest 32 15 99.64
AWID-ATK-R Naïve Bayes 10 15 99.14
AWID-ATK-R Logit Boost 7-a 15 99.56
AWID-ATK-R Logit Boost 5-a 15 99.53
AWID-ATK-R Random Forest, J48, Bagging 7-Cross Validation 15 99.99
AWID-ATK-R Random Forest, J48, Bagging 5-Cross Validation 15 99.99
5.4 Results and Discussion - CICIDS2017
Extensive simulations have been performed on the CICIDS2017 dataset. All the
simulations were carried out using an Intel-Core i7 with 3.30 GHz and 32 GB RAM,
running Windows 10. The results highlight the advantages of feature dimensionality
reduction and balancing on CICIDS2017.
From the research efforts in this work, we were able to reduce the dimensionality
of the features in CICIDS2017 from 81 features to 10 features while maintaining a
high accuracy in multi-class and binary class classification using the Random Forest
classifier. The findings are discussed in following subsections.
5.4.1 Binary class Classification
The study evaluates the performance of binary classification (Bc) in terms of
Acc, FAR, DR and F-M. Tables 5.13 and 5.14 display the summary of the results
obtained. Table 5.13 highlights the results of the dimensionality reduction of the
features in CICIDS2017 from 81 features to 10 features obtained using PCA, whereas
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Table 5.13: Performance evaluation of binary classification using PCA
No.of Features (PCA−RF )Bc−X (PCA−BN)Bc−X (PCA− LDA)Bc−X (PCA−QDA)Bc−X
Acc FAR DR F-M CMBc Acc FAR DR F-M CMBc Acc FAR DR F-M CMBc Acc FAR DR F-M CMBc
81 0.995 0.002 0.984 0.996 0.987 0.975 0.025 0.976 0.976 0.951 0.937 0.254 0.811 0.937 0.846 0.782 0.237 0.978 0.807 0.632
70 0.997 0.001 0.989 0.997 0.991 0.970 0.029 0.966 0.970 0.938 0.947 0.274 0.821 0.947 0.856 0.792 0.247 0.988 0.817 0.642
64 0.996 0.002 0.986 0.996 0.988 0.969 0.029 0.966 0.970 0.968 0.947 0.027 0.820 0.947 0.466 0.793 0.245 0.988 0.818 0.891
59 0.997 0.0017 0.989 0.997 0.991 0.968 0.030 0.963 0.969 0.934 0.947 0.027 0.823 0.947 0.858 0.794 0.244 0.988 0.819 0.646
50 0.996 0.0017 0.989 0.997 0.991 0.971 0.025 0.959 0.972 0.939 0.945 0.028 0.814 0.945 0.880 0.809 0.226 0.988 0.832 0.838
40 0.997 0.001 0.990 0.997 0.991 0.974 0.021 0.953 0.974 0.941 0.944 0.032 0.829 0.945 0.856 0.808 0.226 0.981 0.831 0.646
30 0.997 0.001 0.989 0.997 0.990 0.979 0.026 0.956 0.971 0.703 0.944 0.030 0.821 0.945 0.852 0.830 0.198 0.974 0.849 0.703
20 0.996 0.001 0.989 0.997 0.991 0.965 0.031 0.948 0.966 0.926 0.878 0.025 0.396 0.862 0.612 0.717 0.332 0.969 0.754 0.511
10 0.996 0.001 0.988 0.997 0.991 0.952 0.036 0.897 0.953 0.889 0.869 0.028 0.363 0.852 0.588 0.712 0.048 0.966 0.749 0.911
Table 5.14 displays the results of the dimensionality reduction of the features in
CICIDS2017 from 81 features to 59 features utilizing AE. In the tables, X denotes
the number of features after reduction.
The DR metric revealed that (PCA− RF )Bc−10 is able to detect 98.8% of the
attacks. In the same manner, (PCA − RF )Bc−10 achieved an F-Measure of 0.997.
Moreover, (AE −RF )Bc−59 is able to detect 98.5% of the attacks.
Figure 5.3 highlights the achieved detection rates resulted from the dimension-
ality reduction using PCA, whereas, Figure 5.4 shows the achieved detection rate
using the reduced features set by AE. From Figures 5.3 and 5.4, it is apparent that
Random forest, QDA and Bayesian Network reported significantly higher detection
rates than the LDA for the reduced feature dimensionality of CICIDS2017 using the
PCA approach. The results from the classification using different classifiers assures
that our reconstructing of new feature representation was good enough to achieve
an overall accuracy of 98.5% with 59 features in binary classification using Random
Forest from AE.
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Figure 5.3: Binary class classification: detection rate in terms of number of compo-
nents using PCA
Figure 5.4: Binary class classification: detection rate in terms of number of features
using AE
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Table 5.14: Performance evaluation of binary classification using AE
(AE −RF )Bc−X (AE −BN)Bc−X (AE − LDA)Bc−X (AE −QDA)Bc−X
Acc FAR DR F-M CMBc Acc FAR DR F-M CMBc Acc FAR DR F-M CMBc Acc FAR DR F-M CMBc
81 0.995 0.002 0.984 0.996 0.987 0.975 0.025 0.976 0.976 0.951 0.937 0.254 0.811 0.937 0.846 0.782 0.237 0.978 0.807 0.632
70 0.997 0.001 0.989 0.997 0.991 0.970 0.029 0.966 0.970 0.938 0.947 0.274 0.921 0.947 0.856 0.792 0.247 0.988 0.817 0.642
64 0.996 0.002 0.987 0.996 0.973 0.974 0.026 0.980 0.975 0.948 0.947 0.027 0.816 0.946 0.854 0.935 0.070 0.964 0.939 0.894
59 0.995 0.002 0.985 0.996 0.988 0.975 0.027 0.989 0.976 0.955 0.948 0.030 0.844 0.949 0.866 0.942 0.063 0.964 0.944 0.890
5.4.2 Multi-class Classification
The study used the Acc, F-M, FPR, TPR, Precision, Recall, and the Combined
multi-class metrics to evaluate the performance of multi-class classification. Tables
5.15 and 5.16 display the summary of the results obtained for the dimensionality
reduction of the features for CICIDS2017 from 81 to 10 using PCA, and from 81
to 59 using AE, respectively. In the tables, X denotes the number of features after
reduction.
Figure 5.5 presents the resulting accuracies in terms of the number of principal
components. What is striking about the resulting accuracies in Figure 5.5 is that the
Table 5.15: Performance evaluation of multi-class classification using PCA
No.Features PCA−RF )Mc−X (PCA−BN)Mc−X (PCA− LDA)Mc−X (PCA−QDA)Mc−X
Acc F-M CMMc Acc F-M CMMc Acc F-M CMMc Acc F-M CMMc
81 0.985 0.995 0.986 0.930 0.953 0.925 0.901 0.914 0.801 0.972 0.974 0.961
70 0.996 0.988 0.988 0.948 0.964 0.942 0.894 0.906 0.735 0.967 0.975 0.967
64 0.996 0.997 0.986 0.949 0.966 0.955 0.893 0.906 0.745 0.967 0.975 0.985
59 0.996 0.995 0.987 0.952 0.967 0.917 0.893 0.906 0.677 0.967 0.975 0.880
50 0.996 0.996 0.987 0.924 0.941 0.916 0.859 0.880 0.679 0.927 0.946 0.885
40 0.996 0.997 0.9884 0.964 0.974 0.954 0.890 0.546 0.727 0.966 0.974 0.967
30 0.996 0.997 0.988 0.960 0.971 0.897 0.643 0.643 0.720 0.964 0.972 0.965
20 0.996 NAN 0.987 0.987 0.952 0.855 0.859 NAN 0.4805 0.892 0.886 0.886
10 0.996 NAN 0.986 0.953 0.964 0.946 0.850 NAN 0.363 0.856 0.886 0.886
Table 5.16: Performance evaluation of multi-class classification using AE
No.Features (AE −RF )Mc−X (AE −BN)Mc−X (AE − LDA)Mc−X (AE −QDA)Mc−X
Acc F-M CMMc Acc F-M CMMc Acc F-M CMMc Acc F-M CMMc
81 0.985 0.995 0.983 0.930 0.953 0.895 0.912 0.922 0.908 0.968 0.969 0.920
70 0.996 0.996 0.959 0.953 0.996 0.913 0.894 0.906 0.875 0.960 0.970 0.931
64 0.996 0.996 0.985 0.955 0.968 0.954 0.900 0.908 0.743 0.960 0.969 0.963
59 0.995 0.995 0.983 0.956 0.969 0.958 0.849 0.906 0.737 0.961 0.969 0.963
92
Figure 5.5: Multi-class classification: accuracy in terms of number of components
using PCA
Random Forest classifier shows a constantly high accuracy for reduced features from
81 through 10. In contrast, the resulting accuracies of LDA and QDA cases were
oscillatory. For QDA, the accuracy is wobbling between 66% with 10 features and
96.7% with 60 features. For LDA with 10 and 40 features, the accuracy is fluctuating
between 85% and 96.6%, respectively.
The results of the AE dimensionality reduction approach are displayed in Figure
5.6. The observed accuracy for Random Forest is significant compared to LDA, QDA
and the Bayesian Network classifiers. Furthermore, what stands out in this Figure
5.6, is the increase of the resulting accuracy for LDA for the reduced dimensionality
from 81 through 59 features.
A detailed analysis summary of the proposed framework in terms of False Pos-
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Figure 5.6: Multi-class classification: accuracy in terms of number of features using
AE
itive Rate (FPR), True Positive Rate (TPR), Precision and Recall are tabulated in
Tables 5.17 and 5.18. Table 5.17 depicts the results with 10 features (before applying
UDBB), while Table 5.18 shows the results using 10 features (after applying UDBB).
The weighted average result for all the attacks are presented in bold.
The results confirmed that the proposed framework with the reduced feature
dimensionality achieved a maximum precision value of 0.996 and an FPR of 0.010,
confirming the efficiency and effectiveness of the intrusion detection process. How-
ever, (PCA − RF )Mc−10 is unable to detect the HeartBleed attacks (noted as NAN
in Table 5.17). In this Table, the Recall and Precision values for HeartBleed and
WebAttack:SQL are 0.00, 0.000 and 0.000, 0.000, respectively. A justification of such
outcome could be due to the fact that the number of instances of HeartBleed and
WebAttack:SQL originally embedded in CICIDS2017 is equal to 11 and 21, respec-
tively. This is expected, since the total number of HeartBleed instances in the original
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Table 5.17: Performance evaluation (PCA−RF )Mc−10 before applying UDBB
(PCA−RF )Mc−10 Original Distribution
Recall Precision FP Rate TP Rate
Benign 0.998 0.998 0.012 0.998
FTP-Patator 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
SSH-Patator 0.996 0.996 0.000 0.996
DDoS 0.877 0.900 0.001 0.877
HeartBleed NAN NAN 0.000 0.000
PortScan 1.000 0.998 0.000 1.000
DoSHulk 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
DoSGoldenEye 0.979 0.995 0.000 0.979
WebAttack: Brute Force 0.813 0.878 0.000 0.814
WebAttack:XSS 0.750 0.665 0.000 0.750
Infiltration 0.250 1.000 0.000 0.250
WebAttack:SQL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Botnet 0.960 0.991 0.000 0.960
Dos Slow HTTP Test 0.993 0.996 0.000 0.993
DoS Slow Loris 0.991 0.999 0.000 0.991
Weighted Average 0.996 0.965 0.010 0.996
Table 5.18: Performance evaluation of (PCA−RF )Mc−10 after applying UDBB
(PCA−RF )Mc−10 UDBB
Recall Precision FP Rate TP Rate
Benign 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
FTP-Patator 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
SSH-Patator 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
DDoS 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
HeartBleed 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
PortScan 1.000 0.999 0.000 1.000
DoSHulk 0.999 1.000 0.000 0.999
DoSGoldenEye 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
WebAttack: Brute Force 0.945 0.891 0.008 0.945
WebAttack:XSS 0.884 0.943 0.004 0.884
Infiltration 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
WebAttack:SQL 1.000 0.998 0.000 1.000
Botnet 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Dos Slow HTTP Test 0.999 0.999 0.000 0.999
DoS Slow Loris 0.999 0.999 0.000 0.999
Weighted Average 0.988 0.989 0.001 0.988
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dataset is 11 instances. Thus, these instances were miss-classified by the classifier.
To resolve this issue and to assure that the achieved accuracy is reflected due to the
effective reduction approach, this work applies the uniform distribution based bal-
ancing technique to overcome the imbalanced class distributions of certain attacks in
CICIDS2017.
Table 5.19 shows the performance before and after applying the UDBB ap-
proach. As observed, (PCA−RF )Mc−10 achieved 99.6% and 98.8% before and after
applying UDBB, respectively. In the same manner, (PCA − QDA)Mc−10 achieved
85.6% and 98.9% before and after applying UDBB, respectively. The highest achieved
F-M was obtained by (PCA−QDA)Mc−10. However, the highest CombinedMc metric
(CM(Mc)) achieved was 98.6% by (PCA−RF )Mc−10.
The performance evaluation of (PCA−X)Bc−10 and (PCA−X)Mc−10 in terms
of the time to build and test the model is presented in Table 5.20 (X represents the
classifier in this table). The lowest times to test the model were achieved by LDA
with 2.96 seconds for multi-class and 5.56 seconds for binary class classification.
Here, the Random Forest classifier that has the best detection performance,
comes with the highest overhead in terms of the time to build and test the model.
The fundamental notion behind Random Forest is that it combines many decision
trees into a single model and specifically in this work, the dataset has over 2.5 million
instances in total. This is expected since the worst case time complexity of Random
Forest is estimated using Equation 5.12 [219].
O(MKN2logN) (5.12)
where K is the number of trees, M is the number of variables used in each split, and
N is the number of training samples.
Moreover, a visualization of the dataset with two PCA components before and
after applying the distribution-based balancing approach is displayed in Figures 5.7
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Figure 5.7: 2D Visualization of PCA on CICIDS2017 with original distribution
and 5.8, respectively. This observation of the CICIDS2017 dataset visually represents
how the instances are set apart. As displayed in Figure 5.8, the same type of instances
were positioned (clustered) together in groups. This shows a significant improvement
over the PCA visualization before applying UDBB. Here, the normal instances are
Table 5.19: Performance evaluation of (PCA−X)Mc−10
Classifier Acc F-M CM(Mc)
Before applying UDBB
PCA-Random Forest (PCA−RF )Mc−10 0.996 NAN 0.9866
PCA-Bayesian Network (PCA−BN)Mc−10 0.953 0.964 0.9464
PCA-LDA (PCA− LDA)Mc−10 0.850 NAN 0.3626
PCA-QDA (PCA−QDA)Mc−10 0.856 0.886 0.8862
After applying UDBB
PCA-Random Forest (PCA−RF )Mc−10 0.988 0.988 0.9882
PCA-Bayesian Network (PCA−BN)Mc−10 0.976 0.977 0.9839
PCA-LDA (PCA− LDA)Mc−10 0.957 0.957 0.6791
PCA-QDA (PCA−QDA)Mc−10 0.989 0.990 0.8851
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Table 5.20: Time to build and test the models
Classifier Time to Build the Model (Sec.) Time to Test the Model (Sec.)
Binary-class Classification
LDA 12.16 5.56
QDA 12.84 6.57
RF 752.67 21.52
BN 199.17 11.07
Multi-class Classification
LDA 17.5 2.96
QDA 15.35 3.16
RF 502.81 41.66
BN 175.17 10.07
Figure 5.8: 2D Visualization of PCA on CICIDS2017 with UDBB
very clearly clustered in their own group. This is applied for other types of instances
as well.
The confusion matrix for the PCA−RFMc−10 is shown in Figure 5.9.
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The value for HeartBleed is reported as NAN (Not A Number). These values
result from operations which have undefined numerical values. The classifier PCA−
RFMc−10 fails to classify HeartBleed attacks. In contrast, as a result of applying the
UDBB technique, the PCA−RFMc−10 is able to detect 100% of HeartBleed attacks,
as indicated from the confusion matrix in Figure 5.10.
As exemplified from the obtained results, the PCA approach is able to preserve
important information in CICIDS2017, while efficiently reducing the features dimen-
sions in the used dataset, as well as it also presents a reasonable visualization model
of the data.
Features such as Subflow Fwd Bytes, Flow Duration, Flow Inter arrival time
(IAT), PSH Flag Count, SYN Flag Count, Average Packet Size, Total Len Fwd Pck,
Active Mean and Min, ACK Flag Count, and Init_Win_bytes_fwd are observed to
be the discriminating features embedded in CICIDS2017 [8].
5.4.3 Performance Comparison - CICIDS2017
A comparison between the proposed framework and related work is highlighted
in Table 5.21. The authors in [116], [120], and [121] reported the accuracy.While
others reported the Accuracy,since the CICIDS2017 dataset is imbalanced Dataset
we used F- Measure to compare and evaluate our frame work.As illustrated in Table
5.21 Our proposed framework outperforms previous studies in terms of F-Measure as
well as accuracy.
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Table 5.21: Comparison of CICIDS2017’s related studies and performances
Reference Classifier name F-measure Feature
selection/extraction
(Features Count)
[8] KNN 0.96 Random Forest
RF 0.97 Regressor (54)
ID3 0.98
Adaboost 0.77
MLP 0.76
Naïve Bayes 0.04
QDA 0.92
[112] MLP 0.948 Payload related
features
[114] SVM 0.921 DBN
[113] KNN 0.997 Fisher Scoring (30)
[119] XGBoost 0.995 (80)
for DoS Attacks
[120] Deep Learning Accuracy (80)
for Port Scan Attacks 97.80
[120] SVM Accuracy (80)
for Port Scan Attacks 69.79
[116] XGBoost Accuracy DDR Features
98.93 Selections (36)
[121] Deep Multi Layer Accuracy Recursive feature
Perceptron (DMLP) 91.00 elimination
for DDoS Attacks with Random Forest
Proposed
Framework Random Forest 0.995 Auto-encoder (59)
Proposed PCA with Original
Framework Random Forest 0.996 Distribution (10)
Proposed PCA With
Framework Random Forest 0.988 UDBB(10)
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5.4.4 Results and Discussion CIDDS-001
When using the CIDDS-001 dataset, the experiments and simulations were
carried out using an Intel Core i7 with 3.30 GHz and 32 GB RAM running Windows
10 and the Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (Weka) software along with
MATLAB toolset. Additionally, Keras, an open source neural network library along
with the synthetic minority reconstruction technique (SMRT), was deployed for the
variational autoencoder (VAE).
This research utilizes the following machine learning classification approaches
for intrusion detection in binary classification on the CIDDS-001 benchmark dataset:
• Deep Neural Networks (DNN) [177] with three different architectures: DNN
(3,512,0.1), DNN (3,1024,0.1) and DNN (3,2048,0.1). Each architecture has
three layers and a learning rate of 0.1. The size of the middle layer is 512,
1024, and 2048 neurons, respectively.
• Random Forest (RF) [180]
• Voting technique [93] to vote on OneR, Naïve Bayes, and ExtraTree
• Stacking technique [183] with Linear discriminant analysis (LDA), Naïve Bayes
and OneR
• Variational Auto-Encoder (VAE) [177] with original class distribution (Table
5.22 introduces the VAE’s architectural properties and settings)
The experiments are carried out under two scenarios: With Handling Imbal-
anced Class Distribution (WHICD), and Without Handling Imbalanced Class Distri-
bution (WoHICD). See Tables 5.23, 5.24 and 5.25. In the WHICD scenario, we apply
sampling techniques to handle the imbalanced class distribution of CIDDS-001 before
feeding the data to the classifiers. In the WoHICD scenario, we apply the machine
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Table 5.22: Variational Auto-Encoder properties
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Activation function Elu Optimizer Adam
µ 0 Hidden Size 7
δ 1 Latent dimension 2
No. of Epoch 75 Input Layer 10
Batch Size 128 Learning Rate 0.001
Table 5.23: Deep learning performance evaluation of WHICD and WoHICD scenarios
in terms of Accuracy
Accuracy (%)
Original Distribution Down-Sampling Up-Sampling Class Balancer Spread Sub-Sample
DNN (3,512,0.1) 98.71 98.06 72.06 99.71 94.59
DNN (3,1024,0.1) 99.25 99.01 89.84 98.24 97.26
DNN (3,2048,0.1) 99.65 99.30 94.27 98.77 96.80
Table 5.24: Performance evaluation of WHICD and WoHICD scenarios in terms of
precision, recall, and G-Mean metrics
Original Distribution Down-Sample Up-Sample Class Balancer Spread Sub-Sample
Pre. Rec. G-M Pre. Rec. G-M Pre. Rec. G-M Pre Rec. G-M Pre. Rec. G-M
Random Forest 1.00 0.999 0.999 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.994 0.994 0.994 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.993 0.993 0.993
Voting 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.990 0.983 0.986 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.990 0.980 0.984
Stacking 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.995 0.994 0.994
Table 5.25: Performance evaluation of WHICD and WoHICD scenarios in terms of
Acc, DR, FAR, and combined metrics (Comb.)
Original Distribution Down-Sampling Up-Sampling Class Balancer Spread Sub-Sample
Acc. DR FAR Comb. Acc. DR FAR Comb. Acc. DR FAR Comb. Acc. DR FAR Comb. Acc. DR FAR Comb.
Random Forest 0.999 0.999 1E-4 0.999 0.999 0.999 1E-4 0.999 0.993 0.723 0.0006 0.993 0.999 0.999 1E-4 0.999 0.987 0.724 0.0011 0.857
Voting 0.999 0.990 0.010 0.984 0.999 0.990 8E-4 0.994 0.989 0.999 0.0101 0.984 0.996 0.994 7E-4 0.995 0.980 0.999 0.0203 0.969
Stacking 0.996 0.906 0.001 0.998 0.995 0.910 0.0025 0.950 0.998 0.984 0.0016 0.998 0.996 0.909 0.469 0.483 0.993 0.994 0.0063 0.987
learning classifiers to the original class distribution. We compare and contrast the
two scenarios for the classifiers.
What stands out from these Tables is that the accuracy for the original distribu-
tion was 99.65% for DNN (3,2048,0.1). In the same manner, with down-sampling, the
highest accuracy was 99.30% for DNN (3,2048,0.1), whereas the lowest accuracy was
72.06% using DNN (3,512,0.1). Surprisingly, the same classifier, with the same archi-
tecture, DNN (3,512,0.1) achieved 99.30% accuracy for the up-sampling approach. In
case of Random Forest, the highest achieved accuracy was 99.99% with the original
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distribution, down-sampling and class balancer, respectively. Moreover, with voting,
the accuracy was 99.99% with both the original distribution as well as down-sampling.
In Stacking, the highest accuracy was 99.80% with up-sampling. Lastly, for the VAE,
the accuracy was 97.59% with the original distribution. The VAE architecture of
(10,7,2) was applied for the encoder and (2,7,10) for the decoder, with a learning rate
of 0.001, and ELU activation function (Table 5.22).
To sum up, RF’s performance was better for the original distribution, down-
sampling, and class balancer. Both the RF and DNN approaches have many ad-
vantages that make these two classifiers outperform others. More specifically, the
Random Forest classifier has the ability to select the most discriminatory features
and is able to deal with noisy or incomplete data. The deep learning approach is
likely to outperform other approaches when there is large amount of data. Moreover,
the deep learning approach is capable of taking into account a wide variety of fea-
tures. In our experiments, the Random Forest classifier outperformed deep learning
and stacking techniques. In up-sampling, the generated data might contain noisy or
incomplete data and the Random Forest classifier has the ability to deal with these
issues. In spread sub-sample, the size of the data was reduced. It is known that the
size of the data has an effect on the performance of the deep learning approach. Con-
versely, the size of data has less effect on the performance of Random Forest. Thus,
Random Forest outperformed deep learning in the spread sub-sample technique.
5.4.5 Performance Comparison - CIDDS-001
Finally, a comparison with previous work is highlighted in Table 5.26. The
achieved results for Voting-WHICH, RF-WHICD, and Stacking-WHICH outperformed
previous research work in terms of accuracy.
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Table 5.26: Comparison with prior CIDDS-001 related work
Study Approach Accuracy (%)
Verma and Ranga [128] 2NN 99.60
Verma and Ranga [50] DT 99.90
Tama and Rhee [123] DNN-10-FCV 99.90
Idhammad et al. [125] Entropy+RF 99.54
Proposed Approach-1 DNN-WHICD 99.71
Proposed Approach-2 Voting-WHICD 99.99
Proposed Approach-3 RF-WHICD 99.99
Proposed Approach-4 Stacking-WHICD 99.80
5.5 MCPS IDS Co-Design
In this dissertation, a behavior monitoring tool for four medical devices that
include PCAg, CD, VSM, and CGM devices, respectively were developed. We used
Mentor Graphics ModelSim-Altera software and Quartus II software to simulate and
synthesize the design of the idealized finite state machine (FSM) hardware model that
reflect a Behavior Specification Rules Monitoring (BSRM) tool. Timing simulation
was applied to the design files to make sure that the logic of the design is correct and
to ensure that the synthesized design meets the functional and timing requirements
and behaves as expected. In addition, software-based machine learning approach were
also applied to the same medical CPS IDS.
5.5.1 Results and Discussion of Simulation and Hardware Syn-
thesis for MCPS IDS
Tables 5.27 through 5.34 the show resource utilization and power analysis sum-
maries for PCAg, VSM, CD, and CGM, respectively. Furthermore, Tables 5.35
through 5.38 show timing analysis summaries for PCAg, CD, VSM, and CGM, re-
spectively.
Through our simulation and synthesis, we demonstrated that the BSRM tool
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Table 5.27: Utilization summary for PCAg BSRM
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone III
Device EP3C120F780C7
Timing Models Final
Total logic elements 57 / 119,088 (<1 %)
Total combinational functions 57 / 119,088 (<1 %)
Dedicated logic registers 4 / 119,088 (<1 %)
Total registers 4
Total pins 32 / 532 (6 %)
Table 5.28: Power analysis summary for PCAg BSRM
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone III
Device EP3C120F780C7
Power Models Final
Total Thermal Power Dissipation 120.48 mW
Core Dynamic Thermal Power Dissipation 1.64 mW
Core Static Thermal Power Dissipation 99.06 mW
I/O Thermal Power Dissipation 19.77 mW
Table 5.29: Utilization summary for VSM BSRM
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone III
Device EP3C120F780I7
Timing Models Final
Total logic elements 56 / 119,088 ( <1 % )
Total combinational functions 56 / 119,088 ( <1 % )
Dedicated logic registers 4 / 119,088 ( <1 % )
Total registers 4
Total pins 45 / 532 ( 8 % )
can effectively identify the expected normal behavior of the device and detect any
deviation from its normal behavior. Furthermore, the model is consistent with the
requirements for lower power consumption and higher bandwidth applications. The
FPGAmodule of the BSRM can be embedded in medical devices in order to detect any
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Table 5.30: Power analysis summary for VSM BSRM
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone III
Device EP3C120F780I7
Power Models Final
Total Thermal Power Dissipation 121.77 mW
Core Dynamic Thermal Power Dissipation 1.67 mW
Core Static Thermal Power Dissipation 99.06 mW
I/O Thermal Power Dissipation 21.04 mW
Table 5.31: Utilization summary for CD BSRM
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone IV GX
Device EP4CGX150DF31I7
Timing Models Final
Total logic elements 54 / 149,760 ( <1 % )
Total combinational functions 54 / 149,760 ( <1 % )
Dedicated logic registers 4 / 149,760 ( <1 % )
Total registers 4
Total pins 36 / 508 ( 7 % )
Table 5.32: Power analysis summary for CD BSRM
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone IV GX
Device EP4CGX150DF31I7
Power Models Final
Total Thermal Power Dissipation 141.18 mW
Core Dynamic Thermal Power Dissipation 2.14 mW
Core Static Thermal Power Dissipation 118.71 mW
I/O Thermal Power Dissipation 20.33 mW
deviation from normal behavior specification. The reconfigurable FPGA chip adopts
any design model according to the requirements of the device, patient, treatment
algorithm, and/or pervasive healthcare application.
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Table 5.33: Utilization summary for CGM BSRM
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone III
Device EP3C120F780I7
Timing Models Final
Total logic elements 56 / 119,088 ( <1 % )
Total combinational functions 56 / 119,088 ( <1 % )
Dedicated logic registers 4 / 119,088 ( <1 % )
Total registers 4
Total pins 45 / 532 ( 8 % )
Table 5.34: Power analysis summary for CGM BSRM
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone IV GX
Device EP4CGX110DF31I7
Power Models Final
Total Thermal Power Dissipation 156.92 mW
Core Dynamic Thermal Power Dissipation 2.49 mW
Core Static Thermal Power Dissipation 118.74 mW
I/O Thermal Power Dissipation 35.69 mW
Table 5.35: Timing summary for PCAg BSRM
Attribute Timing Summary
Minimum period 3.25 ns
Minimum input arrival time before clock 7.006 ns
Maximum output required time after clock 4.114 ns
Maximum combinational path delay 8.275 ns
Maximum Frequency 380.700 MHz
Table 5.36: Timing summary for VSM BSRM
Attribute Timing Summary
Minimum period 3.025 ns
Minimum input arrival time before clock 12.601 ns
Maximum output required time after clock 5.278 ns
Maximum combinational path delay 6.256 ns
Maximum Frequency 330.600 MHz
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Table 5.37: Timing summary for CD BSRM
Attribute Timing Summary
Minimum period 2.907 ns
Minimum input arrival time before clock 14.113 ns
Maximum output required time after clock 7.645 ns
Maximum combinational path delay 16.110 ns
Maximum Frequency 343.991 MHz
Table 5.38: Timing summary for CGM BSRM
Attribute Timing Summary
Minimum period 1.914 ns
Minimum input arrival time before clock 10.819 ns
Maximum output required time after clock 5.278 ns
Maximum combinational path delay 12.857 ns
Maximum Frequency 522.371 MHz
5.5.2 Results and Discussion of Software Machine Learning Ap-
proaches for MCPS IDS
In this dissertation, a software-based machine learning approach is adopted to
compare and contrast with the hardware-based behavior specification rules co-designs
for the medical CPS IDS case study. Two classifiers are used, which include Random
Forest and OneR. The Random Forest classifier outperforms OneR with an overall
accuracy of 98.26%. OneR resulted in a lower accuracy of 70.28%.
Tables 5.39 and 5.40 provide the summary statistics of the performance evalua-
tion metrics for the CGM’s software-based machine learning behavior monitoring tool
using Random forest and OneR, respectively. The lowest achieved weighted average
FP rate is 0.014 using Random Forest, whereas the achieved weighted average FP
rate is 0.250 utilizing OneRr. Moreover, the precision value is 0.983 and 0.708 with
Random Forest and OneR, respectively. The time to build and test the model are
exemplified in Table 5.41.
Finally, the confusion matrix charts, Figures 5.12 and 5.11, show the perfor-
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Table 5.39: CGM’s machine learning results with Random Forest
TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure MCC ROC Area PRC Area Class
0.953 0.000 1.000 0.953 0.976 0.974 0.999 0.993 Warning
1.000 0.022 0.970 1.000 0.985 0.974 1.000 1.000 Safe
0.973 0.008 0.991 0.973 0.982 0.965 0.999 0.999 Unsafe
0.983 0.014 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.970 1.000 0.999 Weighted Avg.
Table 5.40: CGM’s machine learning results with OneR
TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure MCC ROC Area PRC Area Class
0.163 0.005 0.778 0.163 0.269 0.332 0.579 0.205 Warning
0.689 0.220 0.693 0.639 0.691 0.469 0.734 0.608 Safe
0.818 0.322 0.708 0.708 0.759 0.500 0.748 0.668 Unsafe
0.703 0.250 0.708 0.708 0.685 0.471 0.727 0.599 Weighted Avg.
Table 5.41: Time to build and test the models
Classifier Time to Build the Model (Sec.) Time to Test the Model (Sec.)
Random Forest 0.5 0.6
OneR 0.02 0.01
mance analysis of classification models for Random Forest and OneR.
The findings demonstrate that for this medical CPS IDS case study, the hardware-
based behavior rules approach achieve better performance metrics results for deter-
mining the malicious behavior of the embedded medical devices, as the safe and
malicious behaviors can be defined as specified deterministic rules.
111
Figure 5.11: Random Forest confusion matrix
Figure 5.12: OneR confusion matrix
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CHAPTER 6: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
6.1 Statistical Power Analysis
In this section, statistical power analysis [220],[221] is performed to estimate
and ensure the appropriate sample size (e.g. the minimum number of instances that
need to be utilized in this study). Figure 6.1 depicts the general steps for carrying
out statistical power analysis [221].
Experimental results show that the accuracy of the IDS using Random Forest
with the proposed five features (5-FSG) outperform the case with 32 features (FSG-
32). Therefore, the power analysis is also used to accept this hypothesis that is stated
Figure 6.1: Statistical power analysis steps
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as an alternative hypothesis Ha, whereas the null hypothesis H0 is the hypothesis
where there is no change in the accuracy using the proposed features with respect to
the 32 features (FSG-32). With the power analysis, a statistical test rejects the null
hypothesis when it is false. Here, the conclusion is that there is a difference between
the accuracies (better accuracy) using 5 features (FSG-5) and we can accept our
alternative hypothesis Ha. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the alternative
hypothesis should be rejected. The opposing hypotheses for our work can be stated
as follows:
H0 : µ5−FSG = µoriginal (6.1)
Ha : µ5−FSG > µ32−FSG (6.2)
where µFGS−5 is the average accuracy of Random Forest using the 5 selected features
and µFGS−32 is the accuracy average of Random Forest using the 32 features for
classification.
To determine the required sample size n, four parameters/factors must be
known or estimated:
• α : Significance level (1% or 5%)
• p : Desired power of the test (80%)
• σ : Population standard deviation.
• d : Effect size (the difference between the two groups)
The values of the first two parameters are generally fixed. The parameter
of significance level α is usually set to either 0.05 or 0.01 and is the probability of
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. The power parameter p is the probability
that the effect will be detected and is usually set to either 0.8 or 0.9. On the other
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hand, the last two parameters are problem dependent. For our analysis, the last two
parameters are estimated based on our experiments and results. Thus, the values of
all the four required parameters are set as below:
• α = 5%
• p = 80%
• σ = 0.217794307
• d = 0.0029
Using these parameters together with the z-test model to obtain z-scores, the
sample size n can be computed by using Equation 6.3.
Sample size (n) = 2×
(
σ × z1−
α
2
+ zp
d
)2
(6.3)
Given the estimated values of the required parameters, we will have:
Sample size (n) = 2×
(
0.218×
z1− 0.05
2
+ z0.8
0.0029
)2
Sample size (n) = 2×
(
0.218× 1.959 + 0.8416
0.0029
)2
Sample size (n) = 88, 644
Using the obtained sample size n and the significance level α, the below pa-
rameters can be computed in order to apply the z-test and then make a decision on
accepting or rejecting our alternative hypothesis:
Mean (xˆ) =
∑
x
n
=
82970
88644
= 0.936 (6.4)
V ariance (σ2) =
∑
(x− xˆ)2
n
= 0.01959536 (6.5)
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Standard Deviation (σ) =
√
σ2 = 0.1399834276 (6.6)
Critical z = z1−α
2
= 1.96 (6.7)
Standard Error (Sx) =
σ√
n
= 4.701667912E − 4 (6.8)
Lower limit = xˆ− (Critical z × Sx) = 0.935 (6.9)
Upper limit = xˆ+ (Critical z × Sx) = 0.937 (6.10)
Null Hypothesis (H0) : µFGS−5 = µFGS−32 = 0.915 (6.11)
Z_test (Z) =
xˆ− µFGS−5
Sx
= 45 (6.12)
Since the obtained value of the z-test is higher than the critical value (45 >
1.96), the observed difference is significant and shows that the selected 5 features
enhance the accuracy of Random Forest for IDS. In other words, the results of the
z-test show that the null hypothesis (H0) should be rejected, and the sample set of
88, 644 instances is sufficient to prove that Random Forest with the 5-FSG is more
accurate than Random forest with 32-FSG. Our experimental results included over
575,643 instances which is more than sufficient to prove the hypothesis claims.
6.2 Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test
This section performs a Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test (WSRT) [222], [223] anal-
ysis to estimate and rank the module of the performance differences between the
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different algorithms that were utilized in this dissertation.
To be more specific, our target is to test two algorithms in several datasets.
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test ( WSRT) is a non-parametric test and is used when
one or more of the datasets are not normally distributed. Furthermore, it ranks the
differences in performances of two classifiers for each dataset, ignoring the signs, and
compares the ranks for the positive and the negative differences.
Experimental results show that the there is a significance difference in the
achieved accuracy using Random Forest in different datasets compared to the achieved
accuracy using Bayesian Network in the same dataset. Therefore, the WSRT analysis
is also used to prove this hypothesis that is stated as an alternative hypothesis H1,
whereas the null hypothesis H0 is the hypothesis where there is no significant differ-
ence in the achieved accuracy using these two classifier models in different dataset.
With the WSRT analysis, a statistical test is rejected (the null hypothesis is
false) when we get a test statistically less than or equal to the critical value [222]. Here,
the conclusion is that there is a difference between the accuracies (better accuracy)
using Random Forest, thus can confirm our alternative hypothesis H1. If the null
hypothesis is not rejected (the null hypothesis is true), then the alternative hypothesis
should be rejected. The opposing hypotheses for our work in this analysis can be
stated as follows:
H0 : AccRandomForest = AccBaesianNetwork (6.13)
H1 : AccRandomForest 6= AccBaesianNetwork (6.14)
Using the obtained accuracies of both classifiers, the number of datasets N and
the significance level α, the below parameters can be computed in order to apply the
WSRT analysis and then make a decision on accepting or rejecting our alternative
hypothesis. The WSRT is described as follows.
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• Calculate R+ as the sum of ranks for the datasets on which the Random
Forest algorithm outperformed the Bayesian Network.
R+ =
∑
di>0
rank(di) +
1
2
∑
di=0
rank(di) (6.15)
where di is the difference between the performance scores of the two classifiers on i
out of N datasets.
• Calculate R− as the sum of ranks for the opposite case; the datasets on which
the Bayesian Network algorithm outperformed the Random Forest classifier.
R− =
∑
di<0
rank(di) +
1
2
∑
di=0
rank(di) (6.16)
Again, where di is the difference between the performance scores of the two classifiers
on i out of N data sets.
• Estimate T as the smaller of the sums, T = min(R+, R−)
• Set the confidence level of α =0.20
• Set the number of datasets to 9
In our experiments, the procedure for WSRT is illustrated in Table 6.1 below:
Table 6.1: Wilcoxon signed-ranks test analysis for multi-class classification
No. of Features Dataset Random Forest Bayesian Network Differences Absolute Difference Rank
10 CICIDS2017 0.996 0.953 - 0.043 0.043 7
10 CICIDS2017-UDBB 0.988 0.976 -0.012 0.012 4
10 CIDDS-001 0.999 0.998 - 0.001 0.001 1
10 CIDDS-001-RWR 0.993 0.999 0.006 0.006 5
10 CIDDS-001-RWoR 0.999 0.999 0.000 0.000 –
5 AWID 0.994 0.998 0.004 0.004 3
5 AWID-SMOTE 0.993 0.963 - 0.030 0.030 5
5 AWID-RWR 0.994 0.963 - 0.031 0.031 6
5 AWID-RWoR 0.984 0.964 -0.002 0.002 2
Table 6.1 shows the comparison of Random Forest and Bayesian Network ac-
curacies. The experiments were performed on 9 datasets.
We are trying to reject the null-hypothesis H0 which sttaes that both algorithms
perform equally well. The ranks are assigned from the lowest to the highest absolute
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difference.
The sum of ranks for the positive differences is R− = 1 + 2 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = 25.
The sum of ranks for the negative differences is R+ = 3+5 = 8. From the calculations,
WSRTstat= T = min(R−, R+) = min(25, 8) = 8, and WSRTCritical = 10.
If WSRTstat < WSRTCritical, we reject the null hypothesis. According to the
table of exact critical values for the WRST, for a confidence level of α = 0.2 and N=9
datasets, the difference between the classifiers is significant if the smaller of the sums
is equal or less than 10. We therefore reject the null hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
There are a number of unexplored areas in which future work could be carried
out to advance upon what has been achieved in the context of this dissertation. In
the following, we elaborate on these possible future directions.
7.1 Intrusion Detection: Software-based Machine Learning
7.1.1 AWID
One of the most challenging problems in the area of machine learning is feature
selection since the selected attributes (features) have an impact on the classifica-
tion results. Twelve well known classifier algorithms; which are J48, OneR, ZeroR,
Naïve Bayes, Random Forest, Simple Logistic, Bagging, LogitBoost, AdaBoost, Ran-
dom Tree, Multi-Layer Perceptron, and Multi-Layer Perceptron-CS; were evaluated
through four different attribute sets of 32, 10, 7 and 5 FSGs. The results confirm that
optimum attribute selection/reduction can lead to better results in terms of accuracy
and processing time.
7.1.2 CICIDS2017
The dissertation examined incorporating auto-encoder and PCA for dimen-
sionality reduction and the use of classifiers towards designing an efficient intrusion
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detection system on the CICIDS2017 dataset. The experimental analysis confirmed
that the adopted feature dimensionality reduction technique leads to better results
in terms of several performance metrics as well classification speeds. These findings
highlight the potential usefulness of auto-encoder and PCA in dimensionality reduc-
tion for IDS. Moreover, the AE and PCA are both feasible and effective dimensionality
reduction techniques for designing efficient intrusion detection systems.
The large number of decision trees that the Random Forest classifier produced
by randomly selecting a subset of training samples and a subset of variables for
splitting at each tree node, makes the Random Forest classifier less sensitive to both
the quality of training instances as well as the over fitting issue. Moreover, Random
Forest is suitable, robust, and stable to classify high dimensional and correlated data.
These explanations provide a justification why Random Forest yielded better results
in comparison with other classifiers [182].
Regarding this study, PCA was very efficient and produced better results than
AE. In comparison with AE, the PCA approach is restricted to a linear mapping,
whereas the AE can have a nonlinear encoder/decoder architecture.
As a future direction, this research will also serve as a base for further studies
and investigations towards developing efficient IDS’s from various intrusion detection
datasets. Furthermore, the trained models could be extended to implement an IDS
for online anomaly-based detection. From our experiments, we found that PCA is
superior, faster, more interpretable and can reduce the dimensionality of the data to
as low as 2 components.
The long training time and limited computational resources formed a barrier
towards reducing the dimensionality beyond 59 features representation for the AE
approach. Future research should therefore concentrate on the investigation of com-
bating these barriers and to go below 59 features after reduction.
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Further research might explore machine learning fault tolerance. Fault tolerance
enables a system to continue operating properly in the event of failure or faults within
any of its components. Fault tolerance can be achieved through several techniques.
One aspect of fault tolerance in our system is the ability of the designed approach to
detect a large set of well-known attacks. Our models have been trained to detect the
14 up-to-date and well-known type of attacks. Furthermore, fault tolerance can be
achieved by adopting the majority voting technique [93, 218].
Moreover, an approach to quantify the resilience of machine learning classifiers
was introduced in [224]. The association of these factors can be investigated as future
studies.
7.1.3 CIDDS-001
A common problem that affects machine learning practically is the imbalanced
class distribution problem as a result of disproportional classes. This dissertation
was set out to design an efficient anomaly-based intrusion detection system on the
imbalanced CIDDS-001 dataset and to compare the ways of treating imbalanced class
distributions with the original class distributions. To compare solutions, we used
alternative metrics such as Precision, Recall, Geometric Mean, Detection Rate, and
the Combined metric along with Accuracy. The experiments confirm that DNN along
with down-sampling and class-balancer lead to effective results in terms of accuracy
of 99.65%. Moreover, Random Forest with less number of samples achieved accuracy
of 99.99%. RF is more effective for real-time data fusion and applications for smaller
sample sizes. It is noticed from this study that the class distribution has a light
impact on the classification process. We believe that this is due to the nature of
the dataset; which has a limited spectrum of attacks, binary classification, features
sets, and finally the classifier type. However, more research on this topic needs to be
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undertaken considering other class labels (Normal, Attacker, Victim, Suspicious and
Unknown) that are embedded in CIDDS-001.
7.1.4 Performance Metrics
In this dissertation, the IDS’s performance was evaluated through a set of met-
rics such as FAR, Acc., DR, F-M, G-Mean, Precision, Recall, and Kappa statistics.
With the imbalanced class distribution problem, the overall Accuracy metric
may fail to provide adequate information about the performance of the classifier.
Furthermore, the Accuracy is very sensitive to the class distribution and might be
misleading in some way. Hence, our dissertation introduced the CombinedMc metric.
The extensive experimental results show that the CombinedMc is able to give better
insight on the evaluation of variant systems for selecting the best among them.
As a future research direction, there is a need to develop new metrics that
must consider memory usage, computational power, detection latency, and power
consumption in evaluating the IDS performance. These metrics are important for
future implementations of IDS in both software-based machine learning and hardware-
based behavior rules co-designs.
7.1.5 Imbalanced Class Problems
With respect to the imbalanced class distribution problem, this dissertation
examined the imbalanced class distribution’s problems through using three datasets
that reflect realistic imbalanced classes. A variety of approaches to alleviate the
imbalanced classes were examined including re-sample with replacement, re-sample
without replacement, class balancing, over-sample the minority class by creating new
synthetic instances, and One Vs All. The dissertation tested these approaches utiliz-
ing the single classifier model, ensemble classifier model, voting, and stacking. The
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dissertation also introduced a uniform distribution based balancing approach to mit-
igate the problems of imbalanced classes.
Future studies on the current topic that investigate cost sensitive learning and
important sampling approaches are recommended. Furthermore, more effort is needed
to further evaluate the number of instances and class distribution in the testing set
when learning from the imbalanced classes.
As network traffic IDS datasets are considered big data, deep learning ap-
proaches for intrusion detection seem to be the future trend as viable solutions. In
the future, deep learning approaches could also be investigated further for anomaly
based intrusion detection. Software-defined-networks (SDN) are increasingly growing
becoming the future of networks. Deep learning approaches can be designed in SDN’s
for IDS.
7.2 Intrusion Detection: Software Machine Learning and Hardware
Rules Based Co-Designs in MCPS IDS
The medical CPS IDS case study determined the effect of using a hardware
approach to detect malicious behavior in sensors and actuators that are embedded in
medical devices. The experimental results confirmed that the specification behavior
rules can be utilized to build a hardware monitoring tool that can identify the ex-
pected normal behavior of a device and detect any deviation from its normal behavior.
Furthermore, we showed through our analysis that our model is consistent with two
dominant design requirements for next-generation high-end applications; lower power
consumption and higher bandwidth. The reconfigurable nature of FPGA allows to
modify and update the whole design according to the set of behavior rules, which
outperform software-based approaches that are difficult to update. In addition, hard-
ware approaches are difficult to be hacked. One of the most significant findings to
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emerge from this study is that a hardware-based specification rules approach can be
used to identify malicious behavior.
The hardware-based behavior specification rules approach yielded better results
compared to the software-based machine learning approach for the same MCPS in
detecting malicious behaviors. It also performs in near real-time. However, if new
rules govern the CPS, the state machine for the behavior rules specifications moni-
toring tool should be redesigned, and the FPGA reconfigured and reprogrammed. A
recommendation is that a hybrid approach be used where the rule-based approach
(possibly embedded hardware) is host-based and the machine-learning approach is
used at the network level (near the routers).
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